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In large part due to the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has emerged as a 
predominant object of study within the sociological community.  This dissertation 
observes terrorist violence through the lens of social movement theory in order to prevent 
its decoupling from contentious politics more broadly defined.  The concepts of political 
opportunity structures (POS) form the theoretical underpinnings for three analyses.  First, 
domestic terrorism is observed as part of the extralegal POS.  This analysis compares the 
effects of corruption and terrorism as dual paths for goal attainment.  Second, domestic 
terrorism is analyzed based on the more conventional POS tenets of regime type and 
repressive capacity.  Finally, the models outlined in the previous analyses are re-
evaluated with respect to several distinct forms of contentious politics.  Results indicate 
that domestic terrorism can be observed to operate similar to corruption in extralegal 
POS.  Mainstream models of POS also support the prevalence of domestic terrorism, 
though they are not substantially predictive of the severity of that violence.  Finally, 
support exists for the inclusion of many forms of contentious politics within the social 
movement repertoire--including domestic terrorist violence--but further research must be 
accomplished in order to improve the models' predictive capacity with respect to each 
individual form.
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 Many would argue that terrorism has existed for millennia.  From the Zealots of 
Judaea to the Assassins of Nizari Islam, the enacting of indiscriminant violence in an 
effort to advance a shared idea has long been a tactic of subordinate and minority groups.  
The advent of the modern nation-state provided these groups with a more stable target 
and a political platform that allowed for the emergence of modern terrorism.  Though 
debate continues on a universal definition of terrorism, the Federal Research Division of 
the Library of Congress provides a reasonably adequate definition of the term: "the 
calculated use of unexpected, shocking and unlawful violence against noncombatants and 
other symbolic targets perpetrated by a clandestine member of a sub-national group for 
the purpose of publicizing a political/religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a 
government or civilian population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause" 
(Hudson and Majeska 1999).  The study of such violence has grown in a peculiar fashion 
over the past 100 years, increasing exponentially in the last 15 years.  In large part as a  
                                                          
1 The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official 






result of the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has emerged as a predominant 
object of study within the sociological community.   
 Unfortunately, the increased attention to terrorist violence also fosters the 
potential to mislead researchers and policy-makers.  The academic community appears to 
be on the course of decoupling terrorism from the broader category of collective action to 
which it pertains.  The singularity of the 9/11 attacks produced volumes of research.  This 
intense inquiry may have decoupled terrorism from political violence by hyper-focusing 
on the act itself and not the broader context within which it manifests itself.  There 
existed a semblance of parity in proliferation on the two subjects prior to 2001.  
However, since that time, articles on terrorism have outpaced those on political violence 
at a rate of five to one.  In a special issue of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence 
(itself a testament to the growing separation of the two concepts), Michael Boyle (2012) 
recognized this decoupling and identified two dangers in allowing it to continue: 1) 
"defining an area of study as 'terrorism studies' will implicitly treat terrorism as an 
exceptional act, rather than as a type of political violence with some unique features"; and 
2) seen as an independent field inquiry, the study of terrorism might become "oddly 
sealed off" from advances in research on other forms of political violence.  Boyle's 
warnings imply that terrorism should be considered a particular form of political 
violence, and that it should be understood through the same mechanisms--particularly 







Resolving the Problem 
 The present group of studies attempts to bring the attention on terrorist violence 
back to the theoretical foundations of social movement theory in order to prevent the 
decoupling described by Boyle.  The origins of social movement theory, from collective 
action to rational actor, opportunity structures and the political process model 
accommodate a vast array of actions within the concept of collective action in general 
and political violence more specifically.  The intent of this introductory chapter is to 
briefly describe the current theoretical perspectives of social movement theory--the 
development of its relevant theories, the structure it establishes, and the actions that can 
be interpreted through its employment. In this manner, the course will be set to strengthen 
the position of how terrorist violence can be better understood as social movement action.   
 
Social Movement Theory  
 Social movement theory began as an attempt to answer the question of why 
individuals participate in group action against the status quo.  Key to answering this 
question was the idea of shared grievances.  Seminal theorists such as Olsen, Park, 
Burgess, and Blumer centered their research around the concepts of collective behavior 
and mass society, relegating the individual actor to a dutiful cog in a larger organism that 
espoused this grievance.   
 As these initial concepts faced the realities of the protests of the 1960s, additional 
theorists began to question this univariate "mindless follower" perspective.  They posited 
that additional factors were involved in the emergence and development of social 




resource mobilization.  This perspective, outlined initially by McCarthy and Zald (1977), 
recognized that conditions beyond shared grievances, such as the availability of 
resources, might play essential roles.  As its name suggests, resource mobilization theory 
focused on the mobilization of a variety of resources (i.e., human, financial, political, 
structural) through a process of creating a base of support, forming recruitment networks, 
arousing motivation through framing issues, removing barriers to participation, and 
building collective identity to maintain levels of commitment. 
 Building upon all of this, contemporary social movement theory recognizes that 
social movements are realized only after certain conditions are present.  Remaining true 
to its founders, first and foremost among these conditions is that individuals harbor 
significant grievances of some kind.  Additionally, these individuals must recognize that 
others share these grievances and that by organizing themselves they can effect some 
change concerning them.  Thirdly, sufficient resources must be made available to such 
organizations in order for them to operate independently.  Finally, the political 
environment must be amenable to the formation of such organizations and the 
vocalization of such grievances.  For social movements to evolve into successful 
organizations, these grievances must be framed in a manner that will garner the support 
of those directly involved in the grievances as well as the support of those with the 
resources required for the development of the movement while utilizing the opportunity 
structures available within the political environment.  It is through the presence and 
effective employment of varying levels of these four conditions that social movements 
emerge and attempt to enact change.  While the lineage of social movement theory has to 




to which contemporary social movement theory is applied before describing how these 
objects operate to produce successful social movements. 
 
Social Movements 
 Simply stated, social movements are "conscious, concerted and sustained efforts 
by ordinary people to change some aspect of their society by using extra-institutional 
means" (Goodwin and Jasper 2009).   Their appearance in modern society has been 
linked with the emergence of the modern nation-state.  Meyer (2007) attributes their 
origin to the dual concepts of checks and balances of state authority and the general 
population's ability to influence and direct state power that developed particularly in the 
evolution of American and British governance in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.  These concepts provided state stability and afforded aggrieved citizens a 
manner of redress "to ensure they are less likely to topple the system as a whole" (Meyer 
2007).  This method of governance spread, and as more and more governments became 
beholden to their constituents for their perpetuation, these same constituents began 
demanding greater and greater levels of rights and liberties.  Each of these pushes--or 
movements--toward some change in responsibility on the part of the state can be seen as 
a social movement.  As noted above, in its infancy, social movement theory saw in these 
mass demands only the sum of often innumerable individual actors deciding to join the 
movement as a sort of mass hysteria.  However, as observations of movements and 
governments' reactions continued, a better understanding of the structure and rationale 





Organizational Structure of Social Movements 
 Research from the 1960s and 70s postulated that social movements acted similar 
to companies operating in the economy and began applying the concepts and theories of 
economic industry to the development of social movements.  Accordingly, several terms 
were incorporated into the lexicon of social movement theory; chiefly, social movement 
organizations, social movement industry, and social movement sector.  In their article 
outlining what became known as resource mobilization theory, McCarthy and Zald 
(1977) defined these three concepts: 
 Social Movement Organization: A complex, or formal, organization which 
 identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a 
 countermovement and attempts to implement those goals. (p. 1218)   
 
 Social Movement Industry: All SMOs that have as their goal the attainment of 
 the broadest preferences of a social movement. (p. 1219) 
 
 Social Movement Sector: All SMIs in a society no matter to which SM they are 
 attached. (p. 1220) 
 
 Utilizing these concepts, McCarthy and Zald shed light on the organizational 
world of social movements.  They identified how organizations within it acquired 
resources, were staffed, branded, and interacted with other organizations and the 
environment within which they operated.  The concepts of constituents, adherents, 
conscious adherents, conscious constituents, and potential beneficiaries described the 
involvement of individuals with SMOs.  They proffered hypotheses on how the lifespan 
of SMOs--as seen through this new light--would be affected.  Others built upon this 







 The emergence, existence, and demise of organizational forms have enjoyed an 
abundance of attention within the study of organizational ecology as researchers have 
attempted to answer Hannan and Freeman's (1977) now classic question: "Why are there 
so many kinds of organizations?"  Theorists from a variety of organizational paradigms 
have provided the groundwork to answer this question based on the specific tenets of 
their disciplines.  Ruef (2000) provides an excellent summary of three such paradigmatic 
perspectives in his exploration of the emergence of organizational forms.  One of these is 
the neo-institutionalist perspective on organizational ecology, which views organizations 
as existing within a population of similar organizations.  According to this view, each 
population of organizations shares a core set of qualities that distinguish one population 
from another.  The absence of these core qualities exclude an organization from 
membership to the particular form.  Pólos (2002) established this method of observing 
organizational forms, and his method has been utilized by prominent researchers to 
identify form emergence (McKendrick and Carroll 2001).  
 A key tenet within the discipline of organizational ecology is that as new 
organizations emerge, they seek to gain legitimacy through identification with a 
particular organizational form in order to survive.  As the density of organizations within 
a form increases, organizations begin to experience competition for resources.  As this 
competition forces some organizations to exit (either by dissolving, being absorbed into 
other organizations, or transforming into a different form), the population stabilizes over 
time (Hannan and Carroll 1992).  Organizational theorists have focused their efforts to 




identified numerous organizational forms.  Hsu and Hannan (2005) provide a list of 
twenty prominent studies whose purpose was to define specific forms.  Often, these 
studies demonstrate how such forms tend to exhibit the general behaviors of density-
dependent legitimation and competition as outlined above.   
 The majority of forms identified by organizational researchers pertain to firms 
engaged in mainstream commercial endeavors such as the automotive industry (Hannan 
et al. 1995), the semiconductor industry (Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan 1996), the health 
care industry (Singh and Lumsden 1990), and financial institutions (Ranger-moore, 
Banaszak-holl, and Hannan 1991), as well as niche markets such as microbreweries 
(Carroll and Swaminathan 2000).  A key similarity among organizations within these 
forms is that in their effort to operate in their respective markets, they conform to state 
and international laws with respect to meticulous documentation and making available 
records of human and financial resources, expenditures, and profits.  The availability of 
data for such firms participating in the global economic machine make identifying and 
understanding the specific characteristics of these organizational forms an easy target for 
researchers.  It may be that research on this community of organizational forms is 
representative of the total population of  organizational forms; however, organizational 
forms do exist for which similar data are not so readily available.  Hsu and Hannan 
(2005) specifically mention forms of this type, labeling them nonconventional industries 
and giving examples such as worker cooperatives and social movement organizations.  
While this research has successfully defended the social movement organizational form 




movement organizations must also be addressed in order to properly set the stage for the 
studies to be presented ahead. 
 
Social Movement Organization Formation 
 As previously identified, the success of modern social movement organizations 
rely on the interactions between the opportunity structure available to the potential 
organizers, the presence of grievances against some larger and more powerful group 
(often the state),  the capacity to frame these grievances effectively, the ability to 
mobilize and coordinate sufficient resources, and the selection of actions intended to 
bring the organization closer to its goals.  The interrelatedness of these components will 
be briefly expounded upon. 
 
Opportunity Structure 
 Arguably, the most significant factor in the development of social movement 
organizations is the environment within which such organizations have the potential to 
form.  In his book Regimes and Repertoires, Charles Tilly (2010) describes how 
government capacity--"the extent to which governmental agents control resources, 
activities, and people anywhere within the government's jurisdiction"(p. 25)--and degree 
of democracy constitute the political environment within which organizations can emerge 
(Tilly calls this "regime space").  He identifies three zones within this environment-- the 
zone of fragmented tyranny, the zone of authoritarianism, and the zone of citizenship--
which directly influence to what extent grievances can be expressed or even recognized; 




to potential organizations.  McAdam (1996) offered a more detailed observation of these 
opportunity structures and identified four key components: 1) the relative openness or 
closure of the institutionalized political system (similar to the level of democracy in 
Tilly's model), 2) the stability or lack thereof in the alignments among elites, 3) the 
presence or absence of elite allies, and 4) the capacity and propensity of the state to 
repress its citizens (Tilly's government capacity).  Variation in the levels of these 
components produces expansive or constrictive effects on the types of collective action 
social movements can implement. 
 
Grievances 
  Of course, social movements would never occur in the first place if there were no 
issue, real or perceived, over which some individual or group felt wronged or harmed to 
such a degree as to voice a dissident opinion.  The statement that "if two people agree on 
everything all the time, only one of them is doing the thinking" applies well to the larger 
interactions of society.  Organizational psychologists have demonstrated the ill effects 
that this "group-think" has on group dynamics, and history is replete with examples of its 
affects at the societal level.   
 It should be of some comfort that society at large has evolved in such a way as to 
allow for grievances to become the impetus for change.  Such grievances arise as an 
inevitable consequence of human interaction.  These differences assist in the healthy 
development of society.  Where such grievances involve the manner by which a 
particular society agrees to be ordered, these grievances often form political conflict, or 




Reduced to its greatest simplicity...political conflict opposes those who 
are more or less satisfied with the existing social order, who want to 
conserve it, and those for whom this order is unsuitable, who want to 
change it. (Oberschall 1973, p. 33) 
Grievances interpreted in this manner became the foundation of early theorization in 
social movement formation (Gurr 1970, Smelser 1963, Turner and Killian 1972), and can 
be distilled into a simple two-part typology: 1) immediate and localized (basic human 
rights), and 2) long-developing and global (social issues).  The development of a social 
movement--particularly its repertoire of contention--is heavily influenced by which of the 
two categories the espoused grievances are most associated with.  More extreme actions 
can be more easily presented as acceptable when grievances involve significant threat to 
the safety and security of the individual and when the opposition is geographically 
accessible.  When grievances of a more ideological basis coalesce into social movements-
-especially in Western democracies--conformity to the political process and the use of 
acceptable legal actions allows the movement to gain the necessary legitimacy, to attract 
the appropriate constituency, and to operate effectively within the much larger system it 
intends to change. 
 
Framing and Mobilization 
 When sufficient impetus emerges behind a particular set of grievances to warrant 
the need for action against the status quo, proponents of these perspectives must garner 
support in order to most effectively influence the political reality.  This is accomplished 
through presenting the viewpoint as relevant, necessary, and attainable to as large an 
audience as possible (Meyer 2007).  Piven and Cloward (1977) identify this as the 




immutable...come to seem both unjust and mutable" (p. 12).  Understanding how this 
process unfolds has been a significant emphasis of sociological research.  The central 
idea of this process revolves around Goffman's concept of frames--the mechanisms by 
which we "locate, percieve, identify and label" our experiences in everyday life.  Frames 
give these experiences meaning, which in turn influence action.   
 Applying the concept of frames to social movements, Snow et al. (1986) provide 
a comprehensive analysis of how the broadcasting of frames by movement organizers 
affects the greater public.  Successful social movements arise when these frames can be 
aligned (frame alignment) with individual frames to generate the desire to associate with 
the movement (frame resonance).  The result of this process is the creation of a collective 
action frame, described as the "action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire 
and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization" (Benford 
and Snow 2000, p. 614). 
 Collective action frames are directly related to the process of increasing the 
capabilities of the organization to effect change.  The study of this process and its effects 
on social movement success are at the heart of the resource mobilization approach.  This 
approach highlights the dual efforts of social movements, evinced through the goals they 
espouse.  In general, social movement organizations develop goals comprising a 
particular dyad: 1) goals that allow for the organization to perpetuate itself (process 
goals) and 2) goals that realize the purpose for which the organization has come together 
in the first place (outcome goals).  Process goals target constituents, bystanders, and the 
primary audience capable of satisfying their demands for change (usually a governing 




recruits and public concern, and the disruption of governance--or in the words of Sidney 
Tarrow, to "maintain solidarity, attract new supporters, and keep opponents off-balance" 
(2011).  Outcome goals are, on the whole, more simplified in that they seek some social 
change.  While this end state can range from instituting some level of particular rights 
(i.e., human, women's, animal, environmental) to removing and replacing entire state 
structures (Islamic caliphate, socialism, fascism, democracy, etc.), the ultimate outcome 
is generally quite focused and well articulated by the organization.  What is common to 
both process and outcome goals is the performance of actions to accomplish them. 
 
Action 
 The existence of grievances, the manner by which they are presented to the 
masses, the level of support this presentation garners in the way of resources all 
culminate in a sustained expression of discontent toward the opposition of a social 
movement.  This expression occurs as social movement action. These actions, in 
aggregate, are the focus of the research presented ahead.  The demonstrative actions 
available to a particular social movement are influenced by the composition of its 
constituents and the resources they provide, the severity of the grievances it espouses, 
and the level of access it has to the political process.  These factors were at the heart of 
Charles Tilly's (2006) understanding of repertoires of contention, or the "limits [to 
potential actions] set by the [claim-making routine(s)] already established for [the] place, 
time and [claimant-object] pair" (p. 35).  He utilizes this concept to explain why today's 




demonstrations, and petitions," while activists from other areas of the world adopt more 
violent forms of protest such as riots, destruction of property, assaults, and terrorism. 
 While repertoires of contention continually evolve, the actions related to them can 
be distinguished--as Tilly did--by whether or not they involve violence.  This distinction 
will be evident throughout the remaining chapters of this dissertation as terrorist acts--the 
focus of this dissertation--are by definition acts of violence.  Chapter 2 will more 
explicitly detail the relationship between the broad concept of political violence and the 
specific characteristics of terrorist violence that fall under its purview.   
 Tilly highlights the role regimes play in the development of these repertoires of 
contention, and some distinguishing characteristics emerge that directly influence the use 
of violent or nonviolent actions.  Collective actions of the violent order are more readily 
observed where the state exhibits a reduced capacity to maintain order.  Following Tilly's 
model, these would include states of fragmented tyranny and young democracies.  This 
typology matches well with research on state polity and repression, which observes that 
weak and failing states (low capacity) and states in transition between autocratic and 
democratic governance experience greater rates of political violence.  Chapters 4 and 5 
will further develop this relationship by specifically observing the effects of particular 
factors evident in conventional opportunity structures (regime type, repression, capacity, 
etc.) on domestic terrorist violence and nonviolent social movement actions. 
 
Perspective and Way Forward 
 The preceding review of social movement's theories and concepts paves the way 




realm of social movement studies as well as for the identification of how this work will 
enhance the field of study on terrorism as social movement action.  The presentation of 
terrorism as a specific form of political violence and therefore a collective action utilized 
by social movements will be approached mainly through the lens of political opportunity 
structures.  This has been alluded to by the emphasis placed on opportunity structures 
above and the attempt to synthesize the major theories on social movements. 
 The innovative application of the concepts and theories of political opportunity 
structures to the utilization and performance of terrorist violence as a social action 
contributes to the greater literature in three distinct ways.  First, it allows for researchers 
to study how terrorist violence fits conceptually within political opportunity structures.  
Chapter 3 will investigate whether terrorist violence can be shown to function as a form 
of extralegal influence within political opportunity structures.  This will be accomplished 
by contrasting terrorist violence with another known form of extralegal influence--
corruption.  Second, it provides a means to determine the influence political opportunity 
structures exert on the choice by social movement organizations to use terrorist violence.   
As noted above, Chapter 4 will attempt to answer the question of whether or not terrorist 
violence operates effectively within the more conventional real of political opportunity 
structures by observing the variation in counts and severity of terrorist violence as 
affected by regime type, level of repression, and state capacity.  Finally, it provides a 
means of empirically testing whether or not terrorist violence can be studied as social 
movement action with the theoretical underpinnings it espouses.  Chapter 5 will evaluate 
terrorist violence against other forms of social movement action--both violent and non-




social movement theory to terrorist violence.  Chapter 6 will summarize the various 
efforts to recouple terrorist violence to the broader concept of political violence, 
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POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM 
 
 Arguably, the watershed moment in the modern study of political violence 
remains the acts conducted on September 11, 2001.  The images of the World Trade 
Center, the Pentagon, and the grassy field in Pennsylvania continue to fuel potent 
emotions more than a decade after their occurrence.  At the time, the incidents motivated 
President George W. Bush to direct "the full resources for [U.S.] intelligence and law 
enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice" (Bush, 
2001).  Utah's ubiquitously well-mannered Senator Orin Hatch summed up the nation's 
intention in less scrupulous verbiage: "We're going to find out who did this, and we're 
going after the bastards!" (CNN, 2001).  Efforts to fulfill those promises have resulted in 
the second-longest war in which the United States has ever been involved, and the 
expenditure of roughly $6 trillion, eclipsing the $4 trillion (inflation adjusted) U.S. costs 
of World War II.    The events of that day had a similar effect on the pursuit of our 
understanding of political violence.  Prior to 2001, sociological research on political 
violence--terrorism in particular--was relatively scarce.  A simple online search for peer-
reviewed published articles on political violence shows that of the roughly 6,800 articles 
published since 1950, nearly 4,700 have been published since September of 2001.  To 




of 2,900 articles published prior to September, 2011, and an astounding 25,000 articles 
since.  It is apparent that just as the events of 9/11 have produced an unprecedented 
monetary expenditure, they have also resulted in an unprecedented intellectual 
expenditure.   It is as if the academic community stood with President Bush and Senator 
Hatch and announced: "We're going to find out who did this, and we're going to 
understand the bastards!" 
 
Defining the Concepts 
 The simplest manner to understand terrorism's place within the broader 
classification of political violence is to establish the conceptual definitions of each. The 
theoretical underpinnings associated with these definitions will provide sufficient support 
for the close association emphasized by Boyle (Chapter 1) as being in potential peril 
within the broader research community.  I will associate the two concepts by beginning 
with the broadest societal classification of action--collective action--and successively 
scoping this classification down through the concept of political violence with a final 
refinement to terrorism.  
 
Collective Action 
 Collective action has been generally accepted to consist of any effort by a 
representative of a group whose purpose is to improve the conditions of that group.  
Theoretically, there are two main approaches to interpreting this phenomenon, and it is 
through the lenses of these two theoretical approaches that the subsequent levels of 




incidents as spontaneous occurrences arising from a cumulative build-up of tension that 
eventually erupted in a demonstrable form of action.  These unstructured actions were 
performed by nonrational actors outside of normative constraints (Morris 1981).  Known 
as the deprivation or breakdown theory of collective violence, this approach saw the 
dissolution of traditional social formations as the result of rapid social change caused by 
social disorganization, demographic pressures, and environmental imbalance (Gurr 1970, 
Oberschall 1978).  This collective behavior approach pointed to the food riots of the 18th 
century as an ideal type, and was characterized as reactive (Tilly 1978).  The second 
approach views the actor in collective violence as rational.  This perspective implies that 
the actor assesses the environment within which he exists and, based on those 
assessments, selects the manner in which he will respond.  This social milieu consists of 
various associations and structures within which the actor navigates to varying degrees of 
effectiveness.  Two subsequent and related theories emerge out of this perspective: 
resource mobilization theory and political process (or political opportunity) theory.  
Briefly, resource mobilization theory contends that collective action (and therefore 
collective violence) follows a task-oriented, economic, rational-choice  model that is less 
reliant on aggrieved populations as the support base than deprivation theory and that 
utilizes the infrastructure provided by society to accomplish its goals (McCarthy and Zald 
1977).  Political process theory incorporates this mobilization process into the broader 
context of available opportunities within the political structure and the framing of 
grievances within the dominant structure (McAdam 1999, McAdam 2001, Tarrow 2011).  
To summarize, collective action as a broad category can be viewed through the lens of 




mobilization and opportunity structures in an attempt to best understand and explain this 
phenomenon.   
 
Political Violence 
 According to Charles Tilly (1978), collective (political) violence is "the struggle 
that results when the undertaking of large action by one group which directly or indirectly 
stakes a claim is challenged by another group."  Such actions reside in the more 
coordinated levels of his typology of interpersonal violence; namely, scattered attacks, 
coordinated destruction, broken negotiations, and violent rituals (Tilly 2003).  Though 
Tilly specifically avoids terms such as political violence and terrorism in an effort to 
remove the negative emotions attached to these labels, they can both be identified within 
the typology.  Tilly recognizes that a large portion of collective violence occurs on the 
political stage and is accompanied by political motivations.  He rightly identifies that 
collective violence tends to "cluster around the entry and exit of groups with the polity," 
and identifies particular actions that can be encompassed by collective violence (riots, 
strikes, organized marches, sit-ins, etc.) (Tilly 1978).  Senechal de la Roche (1996) 
elaborates on such actions, adding to the list lynchings, vigilantism, and terrorism.   
 To this point, the concept of political violence has been nested within the larger 
concept of collective action that has been theorized extensively by researchers utilizing 
the social movement theories of deprivation, resource mobilization, and the political 
process model.  Doing so provides a base and superstructure within which the remainder 




varied concepts contained within the realm of political violence in order to isolate 
terrorism as a specific subset of political violence.  
  
Terrorism 
 The link between political violence and terrorism is robustly outlined by the 
research project Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law.  As one of its 
deliverables, the project published a research paper entitled "Defining Terrorism."  
Within this publication, the project devotes a significant effort to distinguishing terrorism 
from other forms of strategic violence such as organized crime and the various forms of 
inter- and intrastate warfare (COT/ISSCM 2008).  The report demonstrates how terrorism 
shares political violence's inherent characteristics of the illegitimate use of force and the 
goal of changing dominant societal norms and behaviors.  In this manner, terrorism also 
shares the three central aspects of the broader typology of political violence identified by 
Buijs (2001), namely: the instruments that are used, the aims that are sought, and the 
effects that are brought about.  Wilkinson (1986) included domestic and international 
terrorism among the forms of  political violence sharing these characteristics and 
typology (others were sabotage, political gang warfare, assassination, localized guerrilla 
operations, armed rebellion, revolution, and riots).  While the foregoing demonstrates 
how terrorism can be encompassed by the broader scope of political violence, delineating 
the boundaries of terrorism within political violence requires an actual definition. 
 Terrorism as a concept has been defined by researchers in myriad ways, and 
researchers have often compiled, compared, and contrasted these definitions (Goodwin 




researchers conclude, coming to a consensus on a single definition of terrorism out of all 
of these proves difficult.  Inevitably, the definitions evolve into increasingly complex 
classifications in attempts to satisfy the needs of each party's specific inquiry and 
interests.  In fact, Alex Schmid (1984), author of Political Terrorism: A Research Guide, 
devotes over 100 pages to defining the term, but does not arrive at an acceptable 
definition.  In later works, he provides the frequencies of common elements of 109 
definitions of terrorism (Schmid 1988), and ultimately offers an exhaustive definition rife 
with the theoretical underpinnings of political process theory: 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent actions 
employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, 
for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in 
contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the 
main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are 
generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively 
(representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and 
serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based 
communication processes between terrorist (organization), 
(imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the 
main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of 
demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, 
coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (Schmid and Jongman, 
2005: 28, emphasis added) 
 Perhaps the difficulty in defining terrorism is due to the fact that the term implies 
more than a simple act being conducted.  Some researchers have expounded on this 
perspective, realizing that at the end of any effort, what is most commonly accepted is 
that the term terrorism is a pejorative term.  As stated by Bruce Hoffman, professor and 
director of the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University, "it is a word with 
intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one's enemies and 




(Howard, Sawyer and McCaffrey 2003).  In practice, actors perpetrating acts of terrorism 
rarely frame them as such.  The popular adage "one man's terrorist is another man's 
freedom fighter" attests to this distinction.  Turk (2004) agrees with Hoffman, further 
elaborating on the derogatory nature of the term in stating that "the construction and 
selective application of definitions of terrorism are embedded in the dynamics of political 
conflicts, where ideological warfare to cast the enemy as an evildoer is a dimension of the 
struggle to win support for one's own cause."  The overtones of the previous statements 
lend very well to the idea that the labeling of terrorism is of instrumental use to the 
"legitimated" incumbent group as a means of counterattack and results from the 
effectiveness of the "illegitimate" actions taken by the insurgent group.  The statements 
are also explainable through the theories of resource mobilization and framing in that the 
groups seek the support of their respective populations through demonstrating their level 
of commitment to bringing change (the act itself) or by framing the act in a negative way.  
Due to this ongoing political struggle for legitimacy, a consensus on a definition of 
terrorism is rarely reached when the parties involved stand on opposite sides of the 
struggle.  Indeed, the United Nations has failed to agree on a concise definition of 
terrorism for this very reason.  As a result, gaps in the existing thirteen piecemeal 
conventions to combat terrorism cannot be filled by a unifying, over-arching convention 
due to several states' disagreement with how to classify "the struggle for the rights of self-







Terrorism and Social Movement Theory 
 Irrespective of the political issues surrounding the definition of the concept of 
terrorism, if the positioning of terrorism within the realm of political violence as has been 
theoretically constructed in this analysis is to be upheld, its observance must likewise be 
sustained by the political process model.  Accordingly, one would expect to observe acts 
of terrorism as acts of violence conducted by individuals or groups as a result of 
perceived grievances against the dominant regime that have been successfully framed as 
such by a particular group seeking social change and that are dependent upon the political 
opportunity structure available to the aggrieved individual or group.  Research is replete 
with such evidence.    Several articles on the Irish Republican Army during the 1970's 
demonstrate how this social movement organization framed the oppression by the British 
government (White 1993).  Turk (2004) concludes that terrorism is "best understood as a 
response to feelings of indignity and frustration developed in repressive regimes."  In an 
earlier work, Turk (1982) demonstrates that "relational dynamics" within and between 
groups involved in political conflict affect the emergence of terrorism dependent upon the 
manner in which the issues are framed and terrorist actions are "encouraged."  Pape 
(2003) observes that leaders of terrorist groups have linked the use of suicide bombing to 
success in achieving the groups goals, framing the conflict in such a way as to convince 
actors of the usefulness of this specific subset of terrorism.  Beyond simply being 
produced through framing processes, these acts should also be mitigated by the available 
resources of the group seeking social change, as well as the composition of the structures 
and constraints of the political processes within which the groups find themselves.  




perceived opportunities in the Iranian revolutionary movement of 1977-1979.  Dugan, 
LaFree, and Piquero (2005) utilize a rational-choice model to demonstrate how the 
implementation of structural modifications (UN conventions and widespread use of 
metal-detectors) negatively affected attempts at airline hijacking.  Lafree, Dugan, and 
Korte (2009) demonstrate that reactions to such structural modifications and actions by 
legitimate authority can have either a deterrence or a backlash effect largely dependent on 
the cultural impact and interpretation by the aggrieved group.  In this manner, terrorism is 
adequately couched in the political process model and the concepts of grievance, framing, 
resource mobilization, and political opportunity of which it is comprised. 
  Defining terrorism in the manner outlined above provides ample evidence for its 
inclusion as a subordinate to the larger concept of political violence.  Political violence 
encompasses all forms of aggression motivated by a desire to influence others.  However, 
as with the relationship between all species and subspecies, though "terrorism is political 
violence, not all political violence is terrorism"(Laqueur 1999).  While these forms of 
aggression may be utilized in terrorist activity, what sets terrorism apart as a specific 
form of political violence is that the aggression is intended to "influence an audience" 
through "an organized and systematic attempt to create fear and change the political 
order" (COT/ISSCM 2008).  This key difference is recognized in Schmid's breakdown of 
terms used in the definitions of terrorism.  The concepts of "fear and emphasis on terror" 
and "political nature" are surpassed only by the overriding concept of "violence."  The 
remainder of the terms, though not exclusive to terrorism by themselves, produce a 
unique typology when taken as required elements in order to distinguish the event from 




of the Library of Congress succinctly articulates these elements in distinguishing 
terrorism from other forms of political violence based on the presence of all of the 
following factors: "1) the calculated use of 2) unexpected, shocking and unlawful 
violence 3) against noncombatants and other symbolic targets 4) perpetrated by a 
clandestine member of 5) a sub-national group 6) for the purpose of publicizing a 
political/religious cause and/or intimidating or coercing a government or civilian 
population into accepting demands on behalf of the cause" (Hudson and Majeska 1999).   
 The herculean effort undertaken by the U.S. government and military as a result 
of President Bush's pledge to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of the 9/11 
attacks can now be classified as winding down.  The purported results of this effort have 
affected the use of terrorist violence by organizations around the world, greatly 
diminished the influence of al Qaeda (one such organization) in the governance of 
Afghanistan, and brought to justice hundreds of operatives of organizations utilizing 
terrorism as a tactic of strategic influence.  The simultaneous intellectual effort continues.  
Terrorism has been defined and dissected, its agents and mechanisms continue to be 
investigated, and several theories have been applied to the phenomenon.  Unfortunately, 
comprehending the complexity and nuances of what brings individuals and organizations 
to use terrorism as a tactic has proven more difficult than clearing the caves of the 
mountains of Afghanistan and the Kashmir.  Though we have identified and brought 
many of them to justice, we have yet to completely understand the bastards.   
 We have, however, made some progress.  Researchers have studied this 
phenomenon and political opportunity structures for decades, and their efforts will be 




will focus on two points that require substantial attention.  First, in viewing terrorist 
violence from the perspective of the political process model and the opportunity 
structures provided therein, it is important to highlight those factors identified in extant 
research that already comprise the influential characteristics of political opportunity 
structures.   Second, as the studies herein rely on the observance of performances of 
terrorist violence, some attention should be paid to the many efforts undertaken to collect 
information on these performances. 
  
The Influence of Domestic and International Factors on Terrorism 
 Collective action has been defined as any effort by a representative of a group 
whose purpose is to improve or defend the conditions of that group.  Political violence, as 
a subset of collective action, has been defined most broadly as "the struggle that results 
when the undertaking of large action by one group which directly or indirectly states a 
claim is challenged by a second group" (Tilly 1978).  This definition encompasses all 
deprivations of asserted human rights, but can be scoped more narrowly to entail any use 
of physical force, or most narrowly as physical force prohibited by the legitimate 
normative order (1978).  Singling out a specific form of political violence, terrorism can 
reasonably be defined as the "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually to 
influence an audience" (Code 2007).   
 These three levels of action, aside from being nested within each other, possess 
the inherent quality that they arise out of the ordinary interactions between groups--that 




the international level, the majority of sociological research on collective action and its 
subcategories focuses on the interactions of groups with the highest level of discernible 
legitimate normative order, the level of the state.  It is at this level that distinguishable 
characteristics between entities can be measured and evaluated in an effort to understand 
which characteristics at what levels engender similar or distinct forms of collective 
action, political violence, and terrorism.   
 A precise understanding of the causes of these confrontational interactions 
requires knowing every characteristic and previous interaction of each member involved.  
As this is impossible to achieve, researchers have sought to identify the most influential 
of these characteristics for both the dominant group (the polity) and the dissenting group 
(the challenger).  Of interest in the present study are the characteristics of the dominant 
group--the state.  These characteristics can be distinguished between those internal or 
domestic--mainly a product of the composition of the population, its cultures, norms, and 
values--and those external or international--a product of how the state differs from and 
subsequently interacts with other states and the international community.  Accordingly, 
we will first evaluate those domestic characteristics identified in extant literature that 
contribute to the production of the three types of contentious political interactions 
described above.  Next, attention will turn to the international processes affecting these 
domestic issues.  Throughout, I will document the changes in relevance of these 
characteristics and processes over time and how domestic characteristics and 
international processes interact with each other to produce the specific profile of 






 Research has identified four key domestic characteristics of contentious politics.   
Taking the attention given them by researchers as an indicator of their influence, these 
characteristics can be listed by their order of relative importance:  1) inequality; 2) 
government coercion and regime repressiveness; 3) cultural fractionalization; and 4) 
education.  A description of each of these characteristics as well as their relevance to the 
topic of contentious politics follows. 
 
Inequality 
 In Ted Gurr's Handbook of Political Conflict, Harry Eckstein (1980) sums up a 
basic theoretical model (Tilly) of collective violent action: 1) Some group wants 
something it does not have; 2) A fair number of people agree that their claim is justified; 
3) the group is not successfully suppressed to begin with; 4) the group controls some 
suitable resources (and wants to control more).  The first point in this model addresses 
the idea of inequality.  Inherently, a group will only want something it doesn't have if it 
sees that another group has it.  This is the basis for inequality.  Inequality can take many 
forms; however, given the dominance of the capitalist market society, the form most 
prominent, and therefore most investigated, is that of economic inequality: the difference 
in the distribution of wealth or income between individuals or populations.  Nearly all 
research on inequality relies on the theoretical perspective of relative deprivation.  Muller 
(1985) postulated--through relative deprivation theory--that income inequality would 
increase political violence.  His empirical analysis demonstrated that this relationship was 




characteristics of the state (Muller and Weede 1990).  In his study of corruption's effect 
on economic growth, Mo (2001) recognizes that "inequality in opportunities, which is 
similar to income and wealth inequality, will lead to frustration and sociopolitical 
instability" (p. 67), a proposition upheld by empirical research (Alesina and Perotti 1996, 
Fein 1995).  Mo (2001) later states that, specific to income, higher levels of inequality 
give groups at the lower end of the distribution greater incentive to participate in 
collective action, particularly political violence.  Research observing collective violence 
as a form of social control demonstrates how status inequality "measured by wealth and 
other variables" is positively correlated with particular forms of political violence such as 
lynching, vigilantism, riots, and terrorism (Senechal de la Roche 1996).  One caveat to 
the claim that the inequality/contentious politics nexus is the sole domain of relative 
deprivation theorists exists in Boswell and Dixon's (1990) study on dependency and 
rebellion.  Here, they highlight income inequality as a central cause of rebellion--an 
additional form of collective political violence--in nearly all social theories (1990), a 
sentiment echoed by others (Lichbach 1989).   
 
Regime Repressiveness 
 The second state-level characteristic, regime repressiveness and government 
coercion, relates to collective action through the third point in Tilly's model--the group is 
not successfully suppressed to begin with.  Inferred here is the notion that in the ideal 
state, with its legitimate monopoly of force and bureaucracy, dissidence is dealt with in a 
manner that precludes escalation to forms of contentious politics.  Theoretically, 




component in McAdam's (1996) dimensions of political opportunity.   However, 
variation in the manner by which such dissidence is quelled produces varying levels of 
success; hence, varying levels of contentious politics.  The operationalization of this 
concept is often viewed as a combination of the level of repressiveness within a regime--
viewed on a rising scale of how democratic (low repression) to how autocratic (high 
repression) its polity--and the pervasiveness of government coercion--viewed as how 
often the regime utilizes its monopoly of force to influence its population.  The link 
between the polity and coercive capacity of a country and the prevalence of contentious 
politics has been well documented (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012, Chenoweth 2010, Li 
2005, Muller 1985).  The research demonstrates that democracies experience greater 
activity than autocracies.  Associated with this research, Muller and Weede (1990) 
describe a nonmonotonic relationship between the polity of a state and incidents of 
political violence.  At the extreme ends of strong autocracy and strong democracy, 
political violence tapers off, while in the central region (occupied by weak democracies, 
weak autocracies, and states in transition) political violence is elevated (Muller and 
Weede 1990).  This phenomenon was articulated by Helen Fein (1995) as "more murder 
in the middle."  An implication for research with respect to regime repressiveness and 
government coercion is that data on states residing at the highest levels of repression and 
coercion may be significantly unreliable as both have the tendency to control the flow of 
information.  This can be seen historically in the increasing amounts of data available for 







 The third characteristic, cultural fractionalization, refers to the amount of cultural 
diversity that exists within a state.  The differentiation between subpopulations of a state 
based on ethnic, linguistic, and religious variations provides the propensity for 
discrimination.  Based on the ruling party, opportunities can be extended or withdrawn 
from subpopulations, which can give rise to grievances.  Fein's previously mentioned 
research outlined several factors by which life-integrity violations varied among states.  
Beyond repressiveness, her research also investigated how higher levels of ethnic 
discrimination slowed economic growth, and increased political instability and conflict--a 
linkage supported by others (Canning and Fay 1993, Hibbs 1973, Mauro 1995).  Others 
have disputed this relationship.  In their influential work on ethnicity, insurgency, and 
civil war, Fearon and Laitin (2003) challenge the conventional thought that increased 
ethnic and religious fractionalization account for increased levels of political violence 
and internal conflict.  Their results demonstrate no significant relationship when 
controlling for other factors that "favor insurgency" such as population size, poverty, 
political instability, and terrain (2003). In an attempt to correct for an oversight in this 
civil war literature, Cederman and Girardin (2007) find that once power relations with the 
state are accounted for, ethnic identity exhibits a positive and significant correlation with 
political violence.  Separating violence into ethnic and nonethnic categories, Olzak 
(2011) finds that ethnic fractionalization correlates negatively and positively 







 The final key domestic characteristic available in extant literature is education.  
As a state-level characteristic, education is a derivative in no small part of the level of 
infrastructure, economic development, and openness of the state.  As with most of the 
characteristics of states, the level attained in one is dependent upon the varying levels of 
others.  Great disparity in income inequality will affect the overall education level of the 
state; as will the dynamics associated with regime type and cultural fractionalization.  
However, education is key in the emergence of contentious politics as those seeking 
redress can only avail themselves to the actions afforded by differing levels of education.  
Initial forays into collective behavior did not take account of education, and saw the raw 
emotive reaction to grievance as animalistic, arguably equivalent to no discernible 
education level.  Later theorizing accounted for education, and grievances were 
articulated through access to the political opportunity structure.  Education was also seen 
as a requirement to frame issues in order to mobilize constituents and resources.  The 
literature on education as a state-level characteristic demonstrates its applicability to the 
concept of contentious politics in all of these fashions.  Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
observed that higher levels of education resulted in increased political stability, reducing 
the potential for political violence by channeling political action within the opportunity 
structure of the polity (Hibbs 1973, Huntington 1968).  However, Besançon (2005) 
revealed that tertiary education levels corresponded to increased participation in 
revolutionary violence, and Urdal (2008) reported a high correlation between expanding 
higher education and incidents of domestic terrorism.  Synthesizing these observations, 




important predictors of involvement in violence" in that lower levels leave few options 
other than violence, mid-levels produce a rational-action approach based on the 
socioeconomic benefits and obligations attached, and high levels stimulate critical and 
revolutionary thinking.  Mid-level education then appears to exhibit a negative 
relationship with political violence, which stands as part of a larger concept that 
improved socio-economic conditions result in reduced political violence (Caruso and 
Schneider 2011, Freytag et al. 2011).   
 
International Factors 
 Critics of Muller's study on inequality and political violence point to the lack of 
consideration for external factors influencing state action (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 
1985, London and Robinson 1989).  The grand process subsuming the international 
factors affecting the variation of contentious politics among states is globalization.  The 
spread of the market economy and the economic interaction among states throughout the 
world has resulted in relationships that have influenced the internal opportunity structures 
of states in significant ways.   
 
Foreign Investment 
 Among these external factors is the level of influence exerted by other states as 
well as international organizations and businesses through investment in the observed 
state's economy. Viewing such influence as transnational corporate penetration or foreign 
direct investment reveals state structures acquiescing to the demands of their creditors 




constituents.  The effect of foreign direct investment on economic growth and political 
instability has long been studied within dependency theory.  With respect to the differing 
levels of contentious politics, the results from these studies have been contradictory.  
London and Robinson (1989) found that increased levels of transnational corporate 
penetration, measured by capital stocks (a la Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 1985), 
increased the likelihood of political violence. However, Li and Schaub (2004) observed 
that such investments only affected rates of violence indirectly (negatively) through 
promoting economic development.  Focusing on the narrowest band of political conflict 
in this study, Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006) find a significant negative effect of 




  Another manner by which globalization has affected contentious politics within 
states is through the spread of technology.  Events of the Arab Spring of 2011and the 
more recent "Facebook" revolution in Egypt and "YouTube" uprising in Syria 
demonstrate just how vulnerable regimes can be to the spread of dissident ideas through 
modern technological devices.  While researchers have yet to produce much literature 
involving such recent events, one had the foresight to hypothesize about the increased 
availability of technology and the information it offered.  In his book Information and 
American Democracy, Bruce Bimber (2003) lists what he saw as the hypothetical effects 
of contemporary information technology on organizing collective action.  Among these 




change, mainly based on a second effect--the drastic reduction of resources required to 
mobilize.  Both effects can be seen in the most recent technology-aided revolutions and 
uprisings; and certainly, as technology advances, these effects will continue to be of 
critical importance. 
International Organizations 
 A final external factor, brought about in large part due to globalization's increased 
relations among states, is the influence of international organizations like the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and specifically the United Nations.  The major 
effects of the World Bank and IMF have been covered under the category of investment.  
The role of the United Nations in influencing contentious politics arises as a result of the 
need for states to "play with the rest of the world."  Sanctions levied with the backing of 
the UN have forced regimes to acquiesce to the demands of their constituents.  At the 
same time, the implementation of specific conventions related to terrorist actions has 
limited those actions through a closure of certain opportunities.   Specifically, the 
convention on the marking of plastic explosives that has been signed by 148 states 
demonstrates a negative correlation with the number of terrorist events within a country 
based on their year of signing.  It appears from these observations that the international 
organization of states mitigates contentious politics on both sides of the conflict. 
 While it has been noted in specific cases, some emphasis should be made as to the 
general effect of these factors and processes on the different levels of contentious politics.  
Oberschall (1978) theorized that the conditions that lead to violent protest were similar to 
those that lead to other forms of collective action.  The deciding factor in which form 




mobilization in that the more severe the perceived differentiation within the population, 
the more distilled the expression of contentious politics will be evinced.  Acute 
differences of a pervasive nature will lend themselves to the more physical forms of 
political violence and terrorism.   
 The domestic characteristics and international processes outlined in the foregoing 
review demonstrate a dynamic relationship.  While internal factors have effects of their 
own on the potential for groups to enter the field of contentious politics, those effects are 
dramatically influenced by the external mechanisms within which states operate at the 
global level.  As changes in those processes have occurred over time, their interactive 
effects have and will continue to change.  Staying abreast of these changes and 
continuing to interpret their effects will ensure researchers maintain and build upon our 
understanding of contentious politics, whether viewed as collective action, more narrowly 
as political violence, or even more narrowly as terrorism. 
 Several of the factors highlighted in the preceding review will be incorporated in 
the models of social movement action in the subsequent chapters, particularly as the 
pertain to terrorist violence, and Chapter 5 will view their effects on the entire spectrum 
of collective action.  However, as terrorist violence is the focus of this chapter and the 
emphasis of the overarching thesis, I turn now to how information on the performance of 
this social movement action has been collected and made available to researchers. 
 
Terrorism Data 
 The Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) 




world's largest archive of behavioral and social science research data," it was to this 
source that Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman turned in their review of data and databases 
on nongovernmental terrorism (Schmid and Jongman 2008).  While their guide to 
terrorism studies has been updated from the 1988 version, they did not include in this 
update information on the progress of data collection. As a result, they identify fourteen 
datasets that began to be compiled in the late 1960s, but do not provide information on 
datasets past the late 1980s.  Of these fourteen datasets, three emerge as prominent 
sources in current research on terrorist events: 1) RAND Database of Worldwide 
Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), 2) World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators 
(WHPSI), and 3) International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), 
held for some time as the most comprehensive and authoritative source for terrorism data.   
 What were not covered in the Schmid and Jongman review were the Pinkerton 
Global Intelligence Service (PGIS) data on terrorist events.  A private security agency, 
PGIS maintained a handwritten database of these events starting in 1970.  The evolution 
of this last dataset culminated in the development of the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD), which incorporated the PGIS data as well as data from the Center for Terrorism 
and Intelligence Studies, and is continually updated through the efforts of the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.   
 These four databases constitute the majority of sources upon which researchers 
rely in the study of incidents of terrorist violence and are highlighted in Ivan Sascha 
Sheehan's (2012) work on comparing terrorism data sources.  As a result of the analysis 
conducted by Sheehan--particularly his praise for certain aspects of the GTD and the 




ITERATE" (p. 36)--, the public availability of the datasets, and the frequency of updates 
to the datasets, the GTD emerged as the source for incidents of terrorist violence for each 
of the subsequent studies.  A detailed description of this data is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 Having couched terrorist violence within the broader context of political violence, 
described the state-level characteristics most likely to influence social movement action 
like terrorism, and provided and justified the source for data on terrorist events, it is time 
to put theory and data to test. 
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 This study theorizes on the connection between corruption and political violence.  
It attempts to uncover whether domestic terrorism--as a specific form of political 
violence--can be more accurately depicted as an insurgent effort to reduce corruption or 
as an incumbent effort to exert influence when the channel of corruption has been 
rendered ineffective.  Specifically, the concepts of terrorism and corruption are defined, 
and the relationship between the two is investigated through competing hypotheses based 
on social movement theory's (SMT) mechanisms of opportunity structures and 
grievances.  Using a fixed effects longitudinal negative binomial regression based on 
Muller's model of domestic political violence, this study finds a statistically significant 
negative relationship between a leading measure of perceived corruption and changes in 
the rate of terrorist violence for 106 countries over the period of 1990-2010.  Results 
identify corruption and terrorism as shared avenues within an  extralegal opportunity 
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structure and demonstrate that where the avenue of corruption has been restricted, 
countries experience greater rates of terrorist violence.   
 
Introduction 
 Since the end of the Cold War, democracy and capitalism have enjoyed relatively 
unhindered expansion.  The inherent freedoms provided by both of these concepts have 
often led to the development of processes outside of the legitimate structures of 
governance.  When such procedures involve the manipulation of governance through 
bribery, rent seeking, or coercion, they are grouped within the larger concept of 
corruption.  When they involve collective action such as protests, riots, strikes, and 
terrorism, they pertain to the concept of political violence.  Both concepts provide 
mechanisms by which individuals and organizations can accomplish their goals when the 
legitimate structure fails to do so. 
 The lens of SMT brings into sharp relief how these two manipulative concepts 
interact with each other.  The intuitive link between corruption and political violence is a 
reactive one.  Those with significant financial and relational power attempt to accomplish 
their organizational goals by using them to clear the roadblocks that arise through 
bureaucracy and enforceable regulations.  In this manner, they 'capture' the process, 
manipulating it to their will.  Participants in the process who lack sufficient resources to 
'play the game' work within the legitimate structure to decreasing levels of effectiveness.  
As those within the observant public recognize the ineffectiveness of their efforts to 
counter this state capture through the legitimate opportunity structure, they can 




anticorruption programs limit the ability of the former to accomplish their goals.  When 
this occurs, these individuals and organizations can utilize the same mechanism of 
political violence in an effort to regain control of the process.  Viewed in this light, 
corruption can be seen to act as an indicator of political violence.  The levels of 
corruption, and changes in those levels over time, would affect the propensity of those on 
both sides of the issue to use violent means to attain their individual/organizational goals.  
This study will investigate both of these lines of thought by uncovering whether a 
specific subset of political violence--terrorism--can be accounted for by efforts to reduce 
corruption (perspective #1), or to exert influence when the illegitimate channel of 
corruption has been rendered ineffective (perspective #2). 
 
Terrorism and Its Correlates 
 Chapter 2 demonstrated the feasibility of incorporating terrorism within the 
broader context of political violence.  While the amount of research on terrorism has 
exploded, a detailed understanding of the factors contributing to terrorist violence has 
been slow to emerge.  Investigating the potential for causal connections, researchers have 
found there to be little direct connection between poverty, education, and terrorism 
(Krueger and Maleckova 2003).  This contradicts findings that inequality (as an indicator 
of relative deprivation) positively influences the larger concept of collective political 
violence (Muller 1985) and that "among the politically involved, poverty and education 
are important predictors of involvement in violence" (Lee 2011).   
 Higher levels of education have been observed to result in increased political 




corresponded with increased participation in revolutionary violence (Besançon 2005).  
Setting aside the contradictory findings by Besancon, education and political violence 
appear to exhibit a negative relationship, supporting the concept that improved socio-
economic conditions result in reduced political violence (Caruso and Schneider 2011, 
Freytag et al. 2011).   
 The effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic growth and political 
instability has long been studied within dependency theory.  Unfortunately, the results 
from these studies are contradictory.  London and Robinson (1989) found that increased 
levels of FDI, measured by capital stocks, increased the likelihood of political violence. 
However, Li and Schaub (2004) observed that such investments only affected rates of 
violence indirectly (negatively) through promoting economic development.  Adding to 
the controversy, Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins (2006) find a significant negative effect 
of FDI when limiting political violence to leftist and Islamist forms of transnational 
terrorism. 
 Some research on potential factors is less contradictory.  The link between the 
repressiveness of a country and the prevalence of terrorist activity has been well 
documented (Aksoy, Carter, and Wright 2012, Chenoweth 2010, Li 2005).  Research 
demonstrates that open polities experience greater activity than closed.  Associated with 
this research, Muller and Weede (1990) described a nonmonotonic relationship between 
the repressiveness of a state and incidents of political violence--a phenomenon articulated 







 Like terrorism, corruption has only recently emerged as a prominent object of 
analysis in sociological research.  In large part, this new focus was the result of the 
failures of the economic policies of the Washington Consensus espoused by many 
developing nations after the end of the Cold War.  As researchers sought to explain the 
unexpected results of the implementation of trade openness, government divestiture of 
firms, and prudent fiscal policy, they increasingly argued that "key reform initiatives, 
such as privatization, had been distorted due to large-scale corruption" (Azfar, Lee, and 
Swamy 2001).  In the wake of such statements, researchers scrambled to better 
understand corruption and its effects on governance.   
 In earlier research, corruption had been seen as an extra-institutional mechanism 
by which some minimal percentage of revenue was affected in the course of getting the 
business of governance accomplished.  Huntington (1968) and Leff (1964) went so far as 
to suggest that in the presence of repressive or cumbersome economic policies, 
corruption improved the delivery of basic services.  However, researchers found that the 
failures associated with implementing the economic policies of the Washington 
Consensus could be linked to the propensity for political corruption.  Cultural and social 
norms regarding workarounds, payoffs, and rent-seeking that had been part of the 
existing political opportunity structure soon threatened the basic rule of law, property 
rights, and the enforcement of contracts (Azfar, Lee, and Swamy 2001).  Researchers 
quickly began applying theoretical insights in their search for root causes of corruption 




 Those who study corruption usually defer to some form of the definition espoused 
by the international corruption-fighting agency Transparency International: "the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain" (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, Knack 2007, Ledet 
2011).  Inferred in this definition is the understanding that some individual or group is 
inhibited from equal access to some resource, be it economic, political, or social.  This 
inference lends to the application of SMT as a method for understanding the effects of 
corruption on governance.  As will be demonstrated below, several studies have 
attempted to link corruption with the emergence of political violence.   
 Corruption has chiefly enjoyed attention from the fields of economics and 
political science.  To a great extent, economists have focused on defining and refining the 
varied typologies of corruption (Hwang, Jung, and Lim 2010, Méndez and Sepúlveda 
2010).  Unfortunately, investigating corruption's direct effect on political violence is less 
well represented in the literature.  Efforts allude to the potential for corruption to be 
intrinsically linked to instability (Mauro 1995); that corruption has a significant positive 
effect on political instability (Mo 2001); that there is a possibility for changes in the 
patterns of corruption to effect levels of conflict more than its prevalence (Le Billon 
2003); and that it erodes the legitimacy of the political system (Seligson 2002), leading to 
citizen's loss of confidence in government (Ledet 2011) and requiring exogenous shocks 
to correct (Anderson and Tverdova 2003).  Other research emphasizes citizens' rights to 
resist predatory governments (Macpherson 1977, Warren 2004).  Though the above 
research bolsters the case for including corruption as a factor of social movement 
formation, no direct connection from corruption to political violence is made.  




researchers looking at political assassinations (Iqbal and Zorn 2006),  where the lack of 
institutionalized mechanisms to address grievances against the regime existed as 
preconditions to the emergence of political violence (Tilly 1978). However, in describing 
the factors present in such failed institutional mechanisms, they do not include corruption 
(Iqbal and Zorn 2006).   
 From a theoretical standpoint, corruption can be viewed as a source of grievance 
from which social movements might develop and by which they might win resources 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977).  The argument here is that in countries where political 
activists observe higher levels of corruption, those activists will tend to resort to acts of 
violence at a greater rate than in countries with low observed corruption.  This argument 
leads to the following testable hypothesis: 
H1a:   Higher levels of perceived corruption within a country will increase the 
number of terrorist events within that country. 
 In similar fashion, as the level of a country's perceived corruption changes over 
time, changes in the rates of terrorist violence should follow.  If a country is perceived as 
becoming more corrupt, the rate of terrorist violence should increase.  As perceived 
corruption decreases, rates should also decrease.  This leads to a second testable 
hypothesis: 
H1b:   Increases in levels of perceived corruption within a country will increase 
the rate of terrorist events within that country. 
 A second premise views corruption as part of an opportunity structure that 
provides organizations with extrainstitutional channels by which they might influence 




that terrorist violence is highly correlated to political regimes in which corruption is 
embedded in the political opportunity structure (Thachuk 2005).  Where corruption limits 
the capability of certain organizations, it benefits organizations willing and able to use 
this particular extrainstitutional channel.  Where the channel of corruption is well 
established, organizations will select it over terrorist violence.  This argument produces 
the following competing hypothesis: 
H2a:   Levels of perceived corruption within a country will decrease the number 
of terrorist events within that country. 
  As these organizations find the particular avenue of corruption closed by 
transparency and accountability efforts, they may select terrorism as an operational 
alternative.  This argument produces a second competing hypothesis: 
H2b:   Changes in the levels of perceived corruption within a country will 
decrease the rate of terrorist events within that country. 
 
Method and Data 
 Understanding the correlates of terrorism from a comparative perspective goes 
back to Edward Muller's (1985) domestic model of political violence, which was 
grounded in the seminal work of Hibbs (1973).  According to Muller's model, state-level 
factors include levels of regime repressiveness, sociocultural heterogeneity, income 
inequality, economic development, governmental acts of coercion, and the "heritage" of 
rebellion.  In order to better understand the effects of dependency on political violence, 
Boswell and Dixon (1990) introduce an additional variable of transnational corporate 




capital in the form of level of education to the expanded model.  The measures included 
in these models correspond well with the factors already identified in the extant literature.  
The present analysis utilizes these models as a base and follows a similar expansion by 
including corruption as a factor in the emergence and magnitude of political violence.   
 An aggregated dataset was constructed from existing secondary historical data.  
With the exception of the key independent variable, these data were extracted from 
datasets that were freely accessible through online sources.  The datasets are described in 
further detail below under the variable(s) to which they pertain.   
 
Measurement 
 The models required the measurement of the following key concepts: political 
violence, perceived corruption, government coercion, regime repressiveness, cultural 
fractionalization,
3
 inequality, economic development, "heritage" of rebellion, 
transnational corporate penetration, level of education, and population. 
 Dependent variable. Considering the ongoing issue surrounding the definition of 
terrorism, it is understandable that records of terrorist attacks may include, exclude, 
minimize, or exaggerate events based on political motives.  The selection of data sources 
for political violence can be troublesome (Lafree and Dugan 2007, Olzak 2006).  
Research has shown that databases limited to international media reports do not provide 
adequate representation across the globe (Herkenrath and Knoll 2011).  Fortunately, a 
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more detailed and comprehensive database on incidents of terrorism has recently become 
available.   
 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of 
Maryland contains information on over 98,000 incidents from 1970 to 2010.  The intent 
of the GTD is to be as inclusive as possible without falling prey to the methodological 
inaccuracies of previous compilations.  Subsequently, each event must be intentional, 
entail some level of violence or threat of violence, and be perpetrated by subnational 
actors.  Additionally, each event must meet at least two of the following criteria: 
1) Be conducted to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal. 
2) Evince the intention to convey some message to a larger audience than the 
immediate victims. 
3) Be outside the context of legitimate warfare.  
As a result of this broad yet clear conceptualization of terrorism, the GTD is currently the 
"most comprehensive unclassified data base on terrorist events in the world" (START 
2011) and an ideal database for use in this study.   
 The unit of analysis for the GTD is at the incident level spanning 1970 to 2010.  
Annual counts for each country were developed in order to extract information for the 
timeframe of this study (1990-2010).  To do so, a summation of the number of events by 
the country code associated with the location of each event was generated.  As the intent 
of this analysis was to determine to what extent certain factors influenced domestic 
political violence, the data were further constrained to include only those incidents where 
there was no doubt that the incident might be related to some other form of political 
violence; where the target and location of the violence matched; and to exclude those 




result of these aggregations and filters is a dataset of over 43,000 events of domestic 
terrorist violence covering 209 states and territories.
4
 
 Key independent variable.  Attempts to measure actual corruption fall prey to the 
reality that corruption is inherently secretive.  It is preferable to rely on more subjective 
measures of corruption (Ledet 2011).  In a review of the three most popular corruption 
indices in the literature, Donchev and Ujhelyi (2011) found that these indices measured 
the perception of corruption within a state better than they measured the level of actual, 
or experienced, corruption.  The utilization of these three measures of corruption is 
consistent with the literature (Egger and Winner 2006, Foster, Horowitz and Mendez 
2012, Koyuncu and Yilmaz 2008, You and Khagram 2005).  However, researchers 
caution of the difficulty involved in measuring corruption and the limits of current 
measures of corruption (Knack 2007).  Ideally, indices should rely on both firm-level and 
systemic household surveys for measuring corruption.  Unfortunately, the latter often 
proves extremely difficult.  On the other hand, results indicate that elite perceptions 
match well with the mass public (Canache and Allison 2008).  Regretfully, only one of 
the three corruption indices, Political Risk Services'  International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), reaches back beyond 1995.  As a result, it is the only index utilized in the present 
analysis. 
 The ICRG contains 22 components which measure political, financial, and 
economic risk, and has been published since 1984 (PRS Group 2011).  Within the 
political risk factors, PRS includes a measure for corruption that takes into account both 
financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments as well as "excessive 
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patronage, nepotism...and suspiciously close ties between politics and business" (O'Leary 
2004).  The resulting score falls on a scale of 0 to 6, where 0 indicates high corruption 
and 6 indicates low corruption.  In order to facilitate interpretation, this scoring was 
inverted such that 0 indicates low levels of perceived corruption and 6 indicates high 
levels.  Corruption data on the period of the present study covers between 110 and 134 
countries. 
 Government coercion.  Original models utilized the coercive government 
sanctions data from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.  Data 
collection for the most recent iteration of this data began in 1990 but fails to provide data 
beyond 2004.  The physical integrity rights index of the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) 
Human Rights Dataset, with inclusive dates of 1981-2011, provides equivalent data for 
the entire period of the present study.  This index is based on the dataset's torture, 
extrajudicial killing, imprisonment, and disappearance indicators and ranges from a score 
of 1 to 8, with higher scores indicating increasing government respect for these four 
rights.  It is anticipated that a government coercion scores will negatively affect the rate 
of political violence in the form of terrorism pursuant to the theorizing of Boswell and 
Dixon. 
 Regime repressiveness.  Consistent with the literature expounding on Muller and 
Weede's (1990) inverted U-shaped relationship between political violence and regime 
repressiveness, a combined measure of civil liberties and political rights was produced by 
averaging the civil liberties and political rights variables from Freedom House's (2011) 
Freedom in the World ratings that have been collected and published since 1973.  This 




regimes approach the extreme ends of openness and repressiveness.  The variable is 
measured on an ordinal scale of increasing repressiveness from 1 to 7.  It is anticipated 
that this basic measure of regime repressiveness will positively affect terrorist events, 
while the polynomial function will exhibit a negative correlation.   
 Inequality.  The degree of inequality within a country was measured using the 
GINI index reported by the World Bank.  The GINI index is presented as a percentage of 
the maximum area between the Lorenz curve and a line of perfect equality, 0 representing 
perfect equality and 100 representing perfect inequality.  A positive relationship is 
expected between inequality and terrorist violence, consistent with extant literature on 
political violence. 
 Economic development.  Each country's level of development was measured by 
the gross domestic product per capita as reported by the World Bank.  GDP/cap is 
measured in current U.S. Dollars and has been subjected to a logarithmic scale consistent 
with standard practices.  Economic development is expected to have a positive 
relationship with terrorist violence. 
 Heritage of rebellion.  Previous research operationalized this factor by including a 
dichotomous variable indicating the presence of civil war within a country in the prior 
year (Muller 1985).  As the present study is focused on terrorism specifically, a variable 
consisting of a 1-year lag of the dependent variable was introduced as a simple measure 
of period effects.  It is anticipated that this variable will exhibit a positive relationship 
with terrorism, consistent with existing models of political violence. 
 Transnational corporate penetration.  This factor was operationalized as the level 




from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and is a subset of the 
inward foreign direct investment stocks data on individual economies.  This variable 
consists of the percentage of the GDP attributable to foreign direct investment.  Where 
the present study is limiting political violence to terrorism, its relationship with foreign 
investment is expected to be negative, supporting similar research (Robison, Crenshaw 
and Jenkins 2006). 
 Level of education.  While the emulated model (Nasir, Ali, and Rehman 2011) 
utilized literacy rate from the World Bank's World Development Indicators as a measure 
of education, this measure is severely limited when integrated with the final dataset--a 
limitation that persists even after interpolating for missing data.  In order to attain better 
coverage, primary education levels were used as a basic education measure to replace 
literacy level.  To incorporate the findings on tertiary education’s impact on political 
violence, the tertiary education level for each country was also measured.  Both measures 
were derived from the Barro-Lee Education Attainment dataset (Barro and Lee 2013).  
The Barro-Lee data reports the percentage of total population over age 15 having 
completed primary and tertiary education from 1950 to 2010 in 5-year intervals with 
interpolated data for intervening years.  It is anticipated that the relationship between a 
country's level of both primary and tertiary education and terrorist events will be 
negative, reflecting the results of prior research noted in Chapter 2 that improved socio-
economic conditions (including higher levels of education) correlate to a reduction in the 
proliferation of political violence (Caruso and Schneider 2011, Freytag et al. 2011).




106 countries.  Summary statistics and correlations are available from the author upon 
request.   
 
Results 
Initial observations of the dependent variable demonstrate a general increase in 
events from 1970 to 1992.  This trend was reversed from 1993 through 2004 but returned 
again from 2005 through 2010 (see Fig. 3.1).  Two dummy variables representing the 
initial trend ending in 1992 and the surge in events from 2005-2010 were included in the 
models to account for this general shift.  Figure 3.1 also demonstrates an affinity toward 
the second set of hypotheses when the globally averaged corruption data are 
superimposed.  As the general trend of corruption increased between 1993 and 2004, the 
total number of terrorist events decreased.  This inverse relationship was maintained over 
the period of 2005 through 2010 as an increase in terrorist violence appears to correspond 
to a decrease in global perceived corruption.  
Analyses were conducted using a series of longitudinal negative binomial 
regression equations to evaluate the relationship between corruption and incidents of 
terrorism.  Expecting a disproportionate number of zero-incident country/year pairings, 
this method was selected for its ability to account for overdispersion.  In order to 
demonstrate the relationship of changes in levels of corruption and terrorism within 
countries over time, a fixed-effects model was selected. 
A total of three models are presented in Table 3.1.  The first model replicates the 
previous findings of Muller, Boswell, and Dixon and Nasir et al., and investigates 

























   
(-2.03) 
coerc 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 
 
(-5.28) (-5.32) (-5.47) 
L.coerc 0.91* 0.89* 0.90* 
 
(-2.23) (-2.57) (-2.55) 
repress 1.92* 2.00** 1.96** 
 
(2.55) (2.75) (2.64) 
repress2 0.95+ 0.94* 0.94+ 
 
(-1.62) (-1.96) (-1.84) 
loggdp 0.64* 0.68+ 0.68+ 
 
(-2.07) (-1.85) (-1.87) 
inequality 0.97+ 0.97+ 0.97+ 
 
(-1.85) (-1.69) (-1.75) 
logpop 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 





  primary 1.03** 1.04*** 1.04*** 
 
(2.77) (3.30) (3.35) 
tertiary 0.86** 0.91+ 0.92 
 
(-2.64) (-1.66) (-1.58) 
L.domestic 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 
 
(5.96) (5.83) (5.89) 
gtd1984 0.74+ 0.83 0.82 
 
(-1.73) (-1.05) (-1.13) 
gtd2005 2.06** 2.15*** 2.07** 
 
(3.15) (3.38) (3.20) 
N 1411 1411 1411 
Pseudo R-sq .1852 .1866 .1872 






when limiting political violence to acts of terrorism.  It was theorized that shifts in 
activity would be best observed over a 2-year period as groups reacting to such changes 
would delay the use of terrorist violence in order to both ensure the change was durable 
and to mobilize the necessary resources to conduct such actions.  Model 2 introduces a 2-
year lagged variable for levels of corruption (H1a and H2a).  Model 3 adds to this a 
variable accounting for the change in those levels over 2 years (H1b and H2b).
5
   
Consistent with Boswell and Dixon's modification to Muller's domestic model of 
political violence, Model 1 demonstrated a negative correlation between terrorist events 
and government coercion.  The positive effect of repression was also upheld, as was the 
nonmonotonic relationship between regime repressiveness and terrorism.  Model 1 also 
corroborated the result from Boswell and Dixon's model with a weak negative 
relationship between FDI and terrorist events that failed to reach significance and was 
therefore dropped from subsequent models.  While the effects of tertiary education 
corroborated the findings of Nasir, Ali, and Rehman, the effects of primary education 
were significant and opposite the predicted direction.  The effects of inequality, 
development, and education on terrorist violence were each significant and directionally 
opposite previous findings.  While this may appear troublesome, Muller noted that as the 
samples in his model became more comprehensive, the particular effect of inequality 
weakened.  More importantly, as the present analysis restricted political violence to 
terrorism, the underlying relationship may be fundamentally changed (this theme is 
relevant to all control variables in the models).  The results of Model 1 demonstrate that 
                                                          
5
 Tests for multicollinearity demonstrated minimal effects for each of the models, with 
max correlations under .57 and VIFs (max/mean) of 2.27/1.47 (Model 1), 2.28/1.48 




terrorist violence conforms somewhat to the broader category of political violence while 
exhibiting distinct differences.  Additional research is needed to further interpret these 
differences.   
 The introduction of levels of perceived corruption to Model 2 produced results 
that maintained the directionality and significance of all previous control variables 
(though some variation in level of significance was observed).  Levels of perceived 
corruption exhibited a negative correlation with rates of terrorist violence.  On average, a 
one-level increase in perceived corruption scores corresponds to a 26% decrease in the 
rate of terrorist violence within a country, holding all other variables constant (p < .001).
 Incorporating changes in levels of perceived corruption, Model 3 continued to 
maintain the directionality and significance of variables in the initial model, with the 
exception of tertiary education that fell from significance.  Changes in levels of perceived 
corruption also exhibited a negative correlation with rates of terrorist violence.  On 
average, a one-level increase in 2-year change scores of perceived corruption corresponds 
to a 17% decrease in the rate of terrorist violence within a country, holding all other 
variables constant (p < .05). 
 
Discussion 
 Corruption's relationship with terrorist violence was posited to have one of two 
competing effects.  The first set of hypotheses stated that perceived corruption and 
increases in perceived corruption over time would lead to the development of grievances 
that would materialize in the form of terrorist violence.    Results from the analyses 




fact, the results demonstrate that the more corrupt a country was perceived to be, the less 
likely that country was to experience higher rates of terrorism.  Additionally, while 
accounting for these levels of perceived corruption, increases in perceived corruption 
over time decreased the rate of terrorist violence.  These results cast doubt on the notion 
that terrorist violence is the expression of grievances developed in response to perceived 
corruption within the political process.   
 The second set of hypotheses inferred that organizations already utilizing extra-
legal methods such as corruption to accomplish their goals would turn to alternative 
extra-legal methods such as terrorism if the country in which they operated maintained or 
implemented sufficiently high control on corrupt practices.  Results from the analyses 
demonstrate that greater levels of corruption control correlated to higher rates of 
terrorism.  These findings support the theoretical perspective of terrorism and corruption 
as components of an extra-legal opportunity structure used by organizations to 
accomplish their political goals.  In instances where the particular path of corruption 
could not be employed to gain political influence, these organizations utilized alternative 
strategies--terrorism being high on the list--to fill the gap.  While outside the scope of the 
present study, identifying the remaining components of this extra-legal opportunity 
structure may provide greater insight into the particular organizations involved in such 
activities, as well as the ability to counteract or even preempt the formation of these 
organizations.   
 The fact that the analyses supported the second hypothesis over the first may also 
provide insight as to the discrepancies observed among the control variables.  Inequality's 




violence was limited to terrorist acts.  These unexpected results may be due to differences 
in the underlying motivations for each type of violence.  When restricted to the subset of 
terrorist violence, traditional motivations for political violence may not persist.  
Additional research is needed in order to better understand the specific relationships 
between terrorist violence and inequality, development, and primary education 
completion rates.   
 Limiting the type of political violence to terrorism did not have deleterious effects 
on its relationship with government coercion or regime repressiveness.  Increased respect 
for human rights and higher levels of political rights and civil liberties decreased the rate 
of terrorist violence.  Also consistent with the broader literature, repressiveness exhibited 
a nonmonotonic effect on terrorist violence.  Weaker and transitioning polities had 
significantly higher rates of violence than those that were either substantially open or 
repressed.  While this holds true for political violence in general, the theoretical approach 
upheld in this analysis may contribute to an understanding of why this extends to terrorist 
violence in particular. 
 Any inquiry results in the emergence of certain limitations and opportunities for 
future research.  In the present analysis, the corruption measures are based on perception 
and are being used as a substitute for actual levels of corruption.  Although this may be 
an adequate substitute for corruption as intended under the grievance hypothesis, its use 
as a measure under the opportunity structure hypothesis may be less than ideal.  Where 
grievances are based in observed inequalities and arguably through the perceptions of 
individuals, the use of opportunity structures--especially those outside regulated means--




certainly understate the level of corruption within the political opportunity process.  
Developing a better measure for actual corruption, difficult as this might be, would 
improve the analysis.   
 The GTD itself provides unprecedented detail on individual terrorist events.  
Further analysis of this invaluable resource will no doubt shed increased light on the 
phenomenon of terrorism.  For example, the GTD reports casualty and property damage 
estimates.  Such information could be utilized to estimate the available resources of 
terrorist organizations (Overgaard 1994).  Combining these data with the present analysis 
could lend additional support to the theoretical premise that terrorism can be studied 
through the lens of SMT. 
 
Conclusion 
 The present study sought to identify the relationship between corruption and 
terrorist violence through SMT's concepts of grievance and political opportunity 
structures.  Analyses demonstrated that corruption and terrorist violence exhibit an 
inverse relationship that supports the theoretical perspective that they are shared avenues 
within an  extralegal opportunity structure, demonstrating that where the avenue of 
corruption has been restricted, countries experience greater rates of terrorist violence.  
This initial attempt to quantify the relationship between terrorist violence and corruption 
requires further analysis in order to identify under which conditions, in which regions, 
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REGIMES AND TERRORIST VIOLENCE 
 
Introduction 
 The history of any scientific theory reveals how its current state is derived from 
the surviving ideas of prior attempts to explain the object of its study.   Social movement 
theory is no different.  Though continually evolving, the mainstream theoretical 
perspective for explaining the emergence and operations of current social movements 
remains political process theory.  While incorporating the ideas of deprivation and 
resource mobilization theory, political process theory adds to these by expressly 
incorporating a third component--political opportunity.   
 As noted in Chapter 1, political opportunity structures are the mechanisms by 
which organizations and individuals can access the political process and reflect the 
vulnerability of that process to challenges from below.  McAdam (1996) identified four 
key--though not all-inclusive (Goodwin and Jasper 1999)--factors that aid in determining 
what type of political opportunity structure challengers face:  1) relative openness of the 
institutionalized political system, 2) stability among elite alignments, 3) presence of elite 
allies, and 4) capacity and propensity for state repression.  While the stability of 




movements, the focus of the present study will be on the relative openness of the political 
system to those who would demand change and the state's ability to repress them.  Where 
the preceding chapter sought to view terrorist violence as part of a nonconventional, 
illicit, or extra-legal political opportunity structure, the overarching emphasis of the 
dissertation--that terrorist violence should be more clearly considered as a social 
movement action--requires that this violence be investigated with respect to the more 
mainstream components of political opportunity structures.  Taking terrorist violence as 
the object of study, both incidence and magnitude of violence will be investigated.  To 
this end, the present chapter observes the effects of regime type and repression on the rate 
and severity of terrorist violence. 
 
Regimes and Repression 
 Most research on terrorism as an object of study identifies three relevant groups 
involved in the process--originators, bystanders, and targets.  This research is 
distinguished by whether the focus is placed on the originator or the target.  In observing 
originators of terrorist violence, researchers often rely on commonalities in organizational 
structure, goals, ideologies, and individual member psychology.  When studying targets 
of terrorism, the characteristics of the location where the event occurred are more central, 
generally relying on the state-level factors of structure (autocratic/democratic), civil 
liberties, length of regime, economic growth, cultural fractionalization, etc.  As the unit 
of analysis for this dissertation is the state, it is not coincidental that these characteristics 
closely resemble those representative of the political opportunity structures mentioned 





 As noted above, the characteristics of the regime, especially state structure, are of 
key interest when investigating terrorist violence as social movement action.  A 
consensus within the literature links the proliferation of terrorist violence specifically 
with the presence of democratic regimes (Brooks 2009, Chenoweth 2010, Kis-Katos, 
Liebert, and Schulze 2011, Li 2005, Weinberg and Eubank 1998, Weinberg, Eubank, and 
Francis 2008).  Most of this research demonstrates that the number of terrorist events 
increases in the presence of democracy, though it does so nonmonotonically (in strong 
and well-established democracies terrorist violence decreases).   
 The key theoretical perspective running through these studies views democracy as 
an enabling force, allowing for mobilization and expression of dissenting views.  This 
freedom of association is seen to most often foster nonviolent participation in the political 
process, but also allows for the generation and perpetration of violence against the state--
especially when the state has recently experienced or is currently undergoing a shift 
toward greater levels of democracy.  However, the type of regime that characterizes the 
state is only one factor among the many that produce the unique personality of each state.  
As noted at the outset of this chapter, the capacity of the regime to repress its members is 
also of great import. 
 
State Capacity and Repression 
 The relative openness of the political process described above accounts for one of 
the foundations of the political opportunity structure upon which social movements avail 




the state to control dissent.  Tilly (2010) described this concept as the "degree to which 
governmental actions affect distributions of populations, activities, and resources within 
the government's jurisdiction, relative to some standard of quality and efficiency" (p. 21).  
With respect to political violence, this concept has traditionally been operationalized 
under three categories: military capacity, bureaucratic capacity, and the quality of 
political institutions (Hendrix 2010).   The conflation of the latter with regime type is 
apparent when observing the primary measure used by studies following this method of 
operationalization...polity, or the quality of democratic rule (Hegre et al. 2001, Marshall 
and Jaggers 2009).  However, the remaining two categories deserve some additional 
scrutiny.   
 Military capacity refers to the level to which the state maintains a monopoly over 
the use of violence in order to deter challenges to its authority.  This Weberian concept of 
the state is most readily represented by the size of the state's military apparatus.  A crucial 
point in the observance of military capacity as a proxy for the state's capacity to repress is 
whether or not the state has employed this force in an effort to control dissent.  That is, 
there are two ways to measure military capacity with respect to repression: latent and 
manifest capacity.  Both of these aspects have been demonstrated to be useful in the 
measurement of repression (Davenport 2007b).  Relying on the size of the state's military 
is one method of measuring this latent capacity, or the potential of the state to repress.  
The alternative is to observe this potential when it is put in use.  Manifest capacity, or the 
actual repression enacted by the state, is often described according to two categories: 
personal integrity rights violations, and civil liberties violations.  Both of these categories 




the first instance, the rights involved encompass the generally universal human right to 
life and are violated through wrongful imprisonment, disappearings, kidnappings, and 
assassinations.  Studies on the employment of such violations demonstrate that the 
impetus behind their use nearly always stems from protest against the regime and that 
constraint against their employment only occurs under the higher levels of democratic 
governance (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, Harff 2003, Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).  
The second instance of manifest capacity involves the limiting of rights to expression, 
association, assembly, and belief.  Employment of this type of repression often includes 
arrests, bannings, and curfews (Davenport 2007a).  By simply maintaining a significant 
military apparatus or by overtly employing it, states utilize military capacity in the 
suppression of dissent. 
 Bureaucratic capacity measures the state's capacity to repress from an alternative 
angle.  Fearon and Laitin (2003) describe how a state's inability to identify, locate, and 
monitor potential dissenters directly relates to the emergence and sustainment of social 
movement action.  Viewed as the state's ability to collect and manage information, 
studies on how this form of capacity to repress influences political violence focus on two 
categories of measures: revenue-generating capacity, and bureaucratic quality or rule of 
law.  Revenue-generating capacity refers to the ability of the state to extract revenue from 
those it rules.  Higher levels of bureaucratic capacity emerge when the state must rely on 
more administrative means of extraction, such as taxation, as opposed to the reliance on 
natural resources for revenue, which requires less extraction from society, and thus a 
lower level of bureaucracy and bureaucratic capacity.  This distinction has been evinced 




Moore 2011).  Bureaucratic quality influences the state's capacity to repress by isolating 
the administrative process from rapid changes in leadership, and by providing the state 
with increased ability to gather and interpret information on those who would foster 
dissent.  Studies investigating this category of bureaucratic repressive capacity often 
utilize the index developed by Political Risk Services' International Country Risk Guide, 
which measures the ability of the state to remain insulated from political pressure, 
maintain merit-based recruitment and advancement processes, and the capacity to operate 
during changes in state leadership (Knack 2001).  Bureaucratic capacity provides an 
alternative to military capacity in measuring the state's ability to repress.  Inclusion of 
both categories in the models ahead will only serve to enrich the interpretation of 
analyses of repressive capacity's effect on terrorist violence.  This interpretation becomes 
even more enhanced when the effects of repressive capacity are combined with regime 
type. 
  
The Interaction of Regime Type and Repression 
 In his study of how regimes affect contentious politics and vice-versa, Charles 
Tilly (2010) emphasized the importance of including both regime type and repression in 
analyses of social movement action.  His work on regimes and repertoires of contention 
focuses on the interplay between government capacity and democracy, and how varying 
combinations of the two produce differing catalogues from which social movements 
select actions to perform.  Reproduced here as Figure 4.1, Tilly's typology provides a 



















Figure 4.1.  Charles Tilly's "Regime Space" 
 
democratic, high-capacity nondemocratic, low-capacity democratic, and low-capacity 
nondemocratic.  
 When it comes to the particular social movement action of political violence 
against the state, the typology postulates that each of these pairings produces its own 
level of activity.  High-capacity democratic regimes produce low violence because the 
more open political opportunity structures allow for grievances to be more readily 
expressed and the state's effective control of the means of violence dissuades opponents 
from becoming violent.  Both low-capacity democratic regimes and high-capacity 
nondemocratic regimes produce medium levels of violence, but for different reasons.  
Low-capacity democratic regimes, while providing access to the political process, 
demonstrate weakness in their ability to repress dissidence, which increases the potential 




unsuccessful results.  High-capacity nondemocratic regimes, exhibiting strong control 
over the means of violence but limited access to the political process, see political 
violence limited to those windows when the opportunity structures open enough for 
dissent to develop into action.  With little ability to repress and little opportunity to 
engage the political process, low-capacity nondemocratic regimes foster greater variation 
in repertoires of contention that would produce the highest levels of political violence 
against the state. 
 With respect to terrorist violence, the preceding postulates have been born out in 
recent research to varying degrees; however, a comprehensive analysis is still lacking.  
Utilizing economic development as a proxy for state capacity, de la Calle and Sanchez-
Cuenca (2012) studied territory and non-territory-based conflicts and found that non-
territory-based conflicts (including terrorist violence) decreased with greater capacity and 
democracy, though incidents increased among intermediate developing states.  In his 
study of Somalia, Ken Menkhaus (2013) describes how the government's lack of capacity 
to control the use of violence left the state virtually unprotected from terrorist violence 
used to promote instability and further the claims of the political groups who employed 
its use.  Conrad et al. (2014) demonstrate that, in autocracies, the weaker the tyrant's 
capacity to repress--in the form of multiple veto players--results in higher incidents of 
terrorist violence.  Davenport and Armstrong (2004) identify a threshold of domestic 
democratic peace that describes how up to a certain level, democracy has no impact on 
whether or not the state participates in repressive actions.  Beyond that threshold, 
democracy produces a dampening effect.  What has not been reported to date in the 




influence terrorist violence on a grand scale.  Such is the intent of the present study.  By 
observing the effects of both regime type and repressive capacity together on terrorist 
violence in a comprehensive cross-national time-series model, I hope to shed some light 
on whether the typology presented by Tilly can be extended specifically to terrorist 
violence as a social movement action influenced by the political opportunity structure 
under which it emerges. 
 
Counts and Casualties 
 A point with respect to the measurement of terrorist violence should be raised 
before embarking on the present study.  Research on terrorism predominantly focuses on 
its prevalence, with data depicting the number of terrorist events in a given timeframe, for 
a given country, or a pairing of both.  This was the manner by which the study in Chapter 
2 was organized.  However, as data on terrorist violence become more and more detailed, 
new methods for describing terrorist violence as a dependent variable emerge.  For 
instance, given the disruptive effect of political violence--especially terrorist violence--on 
economic trends both nationally and internationally, viewing the damages of such events 
as the costs incurred by the state as opposed to the raw number of events that have 
occurred would produce a more refined analysis.  Analyzing instances of terrorist 
violence through the lens of organizational theory would be better suited if the events 
were coded by organization, producing results that focus on the number of organizations 
actively utilizing terrorist violence within the borders of the state and how variation in 
those numbers may be affected by state-level characteristics.  Of particular interest in the 




the state, given the specific characteristics of regime type and repressive capacity.  
Detailed accounts of the number of casualties resulting from the use of terrorist violence 
by social movements within a state would provide improved understanding of its use 
across the regime space depicted by Tilly in Figure 4.1, specifically with respect to the 
interaction of regime type with repressive capacity.  Indeed, the severity of terrorist 
violence has been a topic of research in several instances (Asal, Phillips, and Rethmeyer 
2013, Bloom 2005, Enders and Sandler 2000, Hoffman 1999, Pape 2003, Piazza 2009) 
and this trend seems to be increasing commensurate with the availability of quality data.  
With the methods for depicting data on terrorist violence increasing over the past decade 
thanks to the tireless efforts of independent researchers, nonprofit organizations, state-
funded academic pursuits, and state agencies, the potential for investigating the effects of 
terrorist violence on ever-expanding areas of social research increases.  But does such 
detailed data, sorted and sliced in so many new ways, produce profiles distinct from one 
another?  Does observing counts of terrorist violence look different than observing its 
severity? 
 
Counts of Terrorist Violence 
 Data indicate that terrorist violence has ebbed and flowed over the past 40 years.  
The rate of terrorist violence showed a marked decline from 1994 to 2004--a roughly 
80% drop--prompting researchers to investigate the preconditions and precipitants of this 
form of contentious politics (Crenshaw 1991, Enders and Sandler 2000, Enders and 
Sandler 1999).  This trend has reversed itself since 2004, demonstrating a return to nearly 









Casualties from Terrorist Violence 
The severity of terrorist violence has been measured as the total number of individuals 
wounded or killed in each event.  The general trend in the literature favors an increasing 
lethality (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, Asal, Phillips, and Rethmeyer 2013, Enders and 
Sandler 2000, Kurtulus 2011, Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas 2003).  Again utilizing data 
from the GTD, Figure 4.3 demonstrates the total number of people wounded and killed  
from terrorist violence.
7
  While some parity exists between number and severity, several 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Global trend in terrorist violence, 1970-2010 
                                                          
6
 Data from the GTD are continuous from 1970 to the present with the exception of the 
year 1993.  Due to a loss of a large portion of the historical records for that year, no data 
are reported.  The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism (START) which houses the database is working to recover this data and to 
provide a complete dataset in the future. 
7
 The data indicate an abnormally large spike in casualties in 1983.  Upon further 
investigation, including inquiries to START, it was determined that this spike was due to 
a database coding error which replaced the number of casualties with the estimate of 
damages in $US (10,000). Extensive analysis determined no other erroneous codings, and 


















































































































Figure 4.3. Severity of terrorist violence, 1970-2010. 
 
variations emerge.  The general increase from 1970-1992 remains intact; however, the 
dramatic 80% drop in the rate of terrorist violence from 1994-2004 is not as clearly 
defined in the casualty data.  Here, only a 50% drop occurs over a shorter period of 1998-
2003.  The trends then demonstrate considerable increases, mirroring each other from 
2004 to 2007 before once again diverging.  These trends have caused problems for 
researchers seeking to link the two.  For the period from 2008 through 2010, the decline 
in casualties coupled with the increase in the rate of violence produces a paradox that 
runs contrary to the findings of several researchers that the lethality of terrorist violence 
is on the rise (Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, LaFree 2011, Laqueur 1999, Neumann 2009). 
 In an effort to better understand how terrorist violence is affected by the political 
opportunity structure within which it presents itself, both counts of terrorist violence and 
the severity of this violence--as measured by the number of casualties--will be used in the 






















































































































violence within a state, it is hoped that more detailed information will emerge on how the 
interaction of repressive capacity and regime type affect terrorist violence.  
 
Modeling the Effects of Political Opportunity Structure  
on Terrorist Violence 
 The model for investigating the relationships between regime type, repressive 
capacity, and their interactive effects (as key factors of the political opportunity structure 
within a state) and terrorist violence (as an expression of social movement action) is 
based on that used by Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze (2011) in their efforts to 
distinguish determinants of domestic terrorism from those of international terrorism. 
Within their research design, they accurately refine determinants of terrorist activity into 
three groups of characteristics that closely align with the factors of political opportunity 
structures highlighted in the present study: 1) economic conditions (citing GDP/capita, 
economic freedom, and human development index), 2) political freedom and civil 
liberties (as a direct measure of the state's expressed repressive capacity), and 3) political 
stability (citing state structure and durability).  Specific to the present study, their results 
demonstrate that “for each additional year of the past five years that a country spent in 
anarchy or transition, the number of terror incidents goes up by between 20 and 25%”  
and that "strongly democratic transition" (represented by at least a 3-level shift toward 
democracy)...has a strong [positive] impact on domestic terrorist violence" (Kis-Katos, 
Liebert, and Schulze 2011).  This model supports the overarching theoretical basis of this 
dissertation, mainly that opportunity structures--here represented by regime type and 




 The "baseline specification" model utilized in the Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 
study relied on the number of domestic terrorist events as the dependent variable, with 
independent variables of population, GDP per capita (often representative of state 
capacity), trade openness, level of democratic effectiveness, and history of conflict.  In 
order to expound upon their findings, this "baseline specification" will be utilized to first 
corroborate their results and then will be expanded to include two measures found to be 
significant in their advanced models that measure communication and percentage of 
population living in urban environments both proxies for economic development and 
level of infrastructure.  The full model includes one of three variables to account for 
repression and a variable to model the interaction of democracy and the particular 
repression variable. Consistent with all of Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze models, this 
first set of models rely on estimations utilizing fixed effects negative binomial regression 
(due to the overdispersion of country/year pairings with 0 events and the desire to 
observe changes within a state over time).   
 As a final analysis, each of these models is further tested by replacing the 
dependent variable of terrorist events with the severity of terrorist violence.  These last 
models are constructed using a two-step selection process described by Greene (1994).  
The first step in this process consists of a probit model based on the presence or absence 
of events in a given year, requiring that the initial dependent variable be recoded as a 
simple bivariate for the presence or absence of terrorist events in a given country-year 
pair.  The second incorporates a negative binomial regression based on the number of 
casualties in a given year for the selected cases and the inclusion of the inverse Mill's 





 Number of domestic terrorist events.  This variable is similar to the count variable 
constructed for Chapter 3.  The GTD data will be refined to only those incidents of 
domestic terrorism.  The circumstances and motivations behind terrorist violence differ 
greatly when distinguishing between events generated from within as opposed to those 
targeting foreign entities.  Distinguishing domestic from transnational terrorist violence is 
difficult when data on the initiator of this violence are scant.  Most events recorded in the 
GTD are realized by unknown actors.  Two general arguments support the method for 
which domestic terrorist events will be coded for the present analysis.  First, events are 
coded by the geographic location of the event as well as the nationality of the target of 
the event.  Where target and location are equivalent, the event may be considered an 
attack from within.  Where target and location differ, the event may be considered an 
external attack.   Second, organizations perpetrating international terrorist events do so 
with an increased expectation for recognition.  These organizations would therefore claim 
events at a higher rate than those performing acts within their own country.  
Organizations working from a weaker position within their own country may seek the 
protection of anonymity at greater rates than those working further out of reach of the 
targeted country.  Given these two premises, a dummy variable for domestic terrorism 
will be created by filtering the data from the GTD such that if the location and target 
nationality are the same and the event is not claimed by an organization external to the 
location of the event, the event will be coded "1" for being an event of domestic 
terrorism.  The remaining events will be coded "0" for transnational terrorism.  This 




given the limitations present in the available data and has been utilized by researchers to 
best separate the two species of events (Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev 2011, Kis-Katos, 
Liebert, and Schulze 2011).  These data will be aggregated at the yearly level by country.  
The result is a time-series data set for 210 countries from 1970 through 2012, and 
includes 46,261 instances of domestic terrorism. 
 Number of domestic casualties from terrorist events.  This variable, derived from 
the domestic-only dataset constructed above, consists of two measures which will be 
aggregated annually.  The first consists of the total number of individuals (targets and 
perpetrators) killed in any given event within a given country for a given year.  The 
second consists of the total number of individuals (targets and perpetrators) wounded in 
any given event within a given country for a given year.  A summation of the two 
measures yields the total casualties occurring for a given country/year pairing.  Results of 
this calculation for the same 1970-2012 timeframe incorporate 106,477 wounded and 
109,190 deaths from domestic terrorist events, culminating in 215,677 total casualties.  It 
should be noted that the reported numbers of deaths and wounded are subject to some 
scrutiny, as the accuracy of reporting is difficult to determine in some instances.  This is 
especially the case with nonlethal injuries.  Given the GTD's propensity to report only the 
most accurate data available, a certain number of events show casualties and deaths as 
missing (6% of incidents for deaths; 9% of incidents for wounded).  In any event, it is 
safe to assume that the numbers are a conservative estimate, and that the actual counts of 
wounded and killed by domestic terrorist violence are only greater. 
 State structure.  The Polity IV Project by the Center for Systemic Peace provides 




Observing the general path of states toward a democratic or autocratic structure, a 
composite measure is provided for the level of authority characteristics for each path, 
resulting in an annual score for autocracy and democracy.  Each of these is represented 
by an additive 11-point scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being highly autocratic/democratic, and 
0 being no discernible characteristics of autocracy/democracy--often recognized as failed 
states, a state in transition, or under foreign occupation.  A third measure derived from 
the previous two will be utilized for the present models.  This measure, known as polity2, 
combines the autocratic and democratic measures by subtracting one from the other, 
resulting in a scale from -10 to 10 with -10 representing highly autocratic structures and 
10 representing highly democratic structures.  These data are available from 1800-2010.  
For the data during the 1970-2010 timeframe of this study, the data are available for 
between 132 and 166 countries.   
 Capacity.  Researchers have utilized a variety of methods to measure state 
capacity.  The previously reviewed comprehensive analysis of these measures conducted 
by Hendrix (2010) revealed that the most appropriate measure of state capacity--when 
investigating civil conflict--was bureaucratic quality.  This factor was measured using the 
International Country Risk Guide's bureaucratic quality variable from the Political Risk 
Services Group.  Data are constructed using a scale from 0 to 4 that relies on surveys of 
area experts with respect to a particular country's capacity to govern without drastically 
altering policy or interrupting government services. On this scale, higher scores indicate 
higher quality and thus greater capacity.  However, as the manner by which repressive 
capacity is defined has been shown to support differing theoretical perspectives, the 




in the form of military strength and violations of personal integrity rights.  Military 
strength is measured as the number of military personnel per 1000 members of the 
population.  These data are derived from the Total Armed Forces Personnel and the Total 
Population data available from the World Bank database.  The resulting data are available 
for 168 to 199 countries over the period of 1985 to 2010.
8
  Violation of personal integrity 
rights was measured using the physical integrity index scores from the CIRI Human 
Rights Dataset developed by Cingranelli, Richard, and Clay (2014).  This index utilizes 
US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty 
International's Annual Report to derive scores based on the violation of rights to freedom 
from extrajudicial killing, disappearance, torture, and political imprisonment, which 
constitute a physical integrity score.  This score is  based on a scale of from 0 to 8 with 
higher numbers equating to greater respect for personal integrity rights.  In order to more 
easily interpret the regression results, this variable was inversely coded such that 8 
represented the highest level of violation and 0 represented the lowest.  Data for this 
measure are available from 1981 and provide data on 202 countries. 
 Trade openness.  Included in the models as an economic control, the openness of 
the economy for each state is measured by adding the state's annual exports and imports 
and dividing that sum by the total gross domestic product.  These figures are derived 
from the Penn World Table maintained by the Center for International Comparisons at 
the University of Pennsylvania.  Data for this measure are available from 1950 to 2010, 
and cover roughly 190 countries and territories. 
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 World Bank data for Total Armed Forces Personnel are available in 1985 and from 
1990-present.  Data for 1986-1989 were produced through linear interpolation where both 




 History of conflict.  A variable was included in the Kis-Katos, Liebert, and 
Schulze model that demonstrated the level to which individual states may have been 
predisposed to political violence.  Theoretical grounding for including this variable in the 
present study--other than to match the published findings--lies in Tilly's concept of 
repertoires of contention.  A society mainly draws upon the program of violence it has 
experience with.  Accounting for the state's experience with internal conflict will allow 
for interpretations free from bias in this regard.  Data on conflict were derived from the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.  This dataset lists 
each conflict, the years over which the conflict occurred, and the primary and secondary 
parties involved on both sides of the conflict from 1946 through 2010.  Constructing this 
variable required parsing out which states were involved in each conflict, regardless of 
which side of the conflict the state was on or whether the state had a primary or 
secondary role in the conflict.  Following the Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze 
methodology, each country/year pairing was coded "1" if the state was involved in at 
least one conflict, and "0" if the state was not involved in any conflict.  A running 
summation of the previous 5 years produces the variable utilized in the present models, 
ranging from 0 to 5 years of historical conflict. 
 Beyond accounting for historical state-level conflict, an additional variable 
providing the average number of terrorist events over the previous 5 years is included to 
account for the state's specific history of terrorist violence. 
 Decline.  In order to capture the trend in the data on incidents of domestic terrorist 




1992 to 2004.  The inclusion of this variable will aid in removing some of the noise 
inherent in the model. 
 Finally, several factors from the World Development Indicators of the World 
Bank are also utilized.  These include Population (total) (as noted above), GDP per 
capita (constant 2005 $US), Urban Population (% of total), as well as Mobile Cellular 
Subscriptions and Telephone Lines (aggregated to produce a composite indicator of the 
level of communications infrastructure).  All World Bank indicators are available from 
1980 to the present, with varying levels of coverage. 
 
Results and Discussion 
  All initial models were run on a constant sample of the data, resulting in 1740 
observations of 77 countries over an average of 22.6 years.
9
  These results are presented 
in the form of incidence rate ratios, demonstrating to what factor expected domestic 
terrorist violence increases for each unit increase in the explanatory variable of the 
model.  The result is a value truncated at 0, but open on the positive end of the scale.  The 
ratios are interpreted as decreasing for values less than 1.00 and increasing for values 
greater than 1.00.  Thus a value of 0.05 would be interpreted as a 95% reduction in the 
dependent variable for each 1-level increase in the explanatory variable, and a value of 
2.45 would be interpreted as a 145% increase in the dependent variable for each 1-level 
increase in the explanatory variable.  All models were conducted using year fixed effects 
in order to account for any time-independent factors relating to the state such as terrain, 
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 Tests for multicollinearity demonstrated effects within tolerances for each of the 
models.  Max correlations < .56, VIFs (max/mean) Model 1 (5.8/2.85) Model 2 
(5.93/2.95) Model 3 (6.98/3.74) Model 4 (5.85/2.77) Model 5 (5.86/2.84) Model 6 




cultural fractionalization, etc.  Table 4.1 presents the results of the first set of models 
evaluating the effects of repression on the prevalence of terrorist violence.   Column 1 
represents the baseline specification.  These results are consistent with those of Kis-
Katos, Liebert, and Schulze in direction, magnitude, and significance, giving confidence 
that the models and results can be compared and contrasted.  Columns 2 through 7 
represent models testing each of the three measures of state capacity to repress along with 
their interaction effects with regime type.   
 Immediately apparent in these results is that inclusion of each of the variables and 
interactions measuring state repressive capacity does not alter the direction of any of the 
baseline factors.  The significance of these baseline factors varies only slightly, the 
greatest being the increase related to the urban variable when observing the measures of 
military capacity (manifest and latent), where results moved from nonsignificant to 
significant.  When observing the effect of manifest military capacity to repress (physint), 
both the net effect and its interaction are positive and significant.  A one-level increase in 
violation of physical integrity rights equates to a 20% increase in domestic terrorism.  
Substituting the repression variable for latent capacity to repress (imilperspc) 
demonstrates similar results for both the term and its interaction, though not as strong in 
magnitude.  A one-level increase in the ratio of military personnel/1000 results in a 3% 
increase in incidents of domestic terrorism.  The final measure, bureaucratic capacity for 
repression (bureaucratic), exhibits a similar result for the net effect, though the 
interaction effect is opposite those observed with the military capacity variables.  A one-
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Regimes and Repression Revisited 
 Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze found that democracy was positively related to 
incidence of terrorist violence.  They argue that this is due to the fact that the presence 
and level of democracy does not reduce grievance to the same degree that it increases 
government constraint to use repressive measures.  Their findings quietly assume the 
correlation between regime type and repression discussed earlier.  Unfortunately, they do 
not offer any measurement of repression (latent or manifest) in their model to support this 
argument.  By including the three measures of repressive capacity in models 2, 4, and 6, 
and their interactions in models 3, 5, and 7, we can more clearly understand this 
relationship and how it relates to the typology articulated by Tilly.  Predicted values were 
attained for each of the interaction models based on thresholds specifying the four 
quadrants of Tilly's typology and are presented below as Figure 4.4 in order to facilitate 
further discussion. 
The models indicate that--for domestic terrorist violence--greater levels of 
democracy correlate to greater numbers of events.  A one-level increase in democracy 
results in a 4-8% increase in events.  As shown above, the net effect of state capacity for 
repression on domestic terrorism varies based upon the measure used, though all three 
indicate increases in events with increases in repressive capacity.  
Tilly's high-capacity democracies were theorized to exhibit low levels of violence 
based on open access to the political process and effective control of the means of 
violence.  Interestingly, the interactions between polity and repression demonstrate the 
strongest effect in this category.  Strong democracies exhibit the highest predicted 









































effect is most evident when observing manifest repression in the form of physical 
integrity rights violations.  Examples from the models of the most enduring of these 
repressive democracies include Colombia, India, the Philippines, Turkey, and Venezuela.  
While the effect is not strong enough to reverse the trend when observing latent 
bureaucratic capacity, it is attenuated.  Higher levels of democracy and bureaucratic 
quality are predicted to produce lower rates of domestic terrorism.  Countries from the 
models fitting this profile include Belgium, Canada, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Thailand, and the United States.  The key 
difference then is in the employment of repressive capacity.  When the threat exists but is 
not used, events are predicted to decrease as Tilly's typology would suggest.  When the 
threat is actively carried out, predicted events increase. 
 Low-capacity democracies (i.e., Bolivia, El Salvador, Haiti, Mali, Nicaragua, 
Senegal, and Sierra Leone) and high-capacity nondemocratic regimes (i.e., China, Iran, 
Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Niger, Syria, and Zimbabwe) exhibit the predicted intermediate 
levels of domestic terrorist violence.  This appears to be the case regardless of the 
measure of repressive capacity.  Low-capacity nondemocratic regimes (i.e., Congo 
(Kinshasa), Gabon, Haiti, Liberia, Paraguay, and Togo), thought to produce the highest 
levels of political violence, in fact demonstrate the lowest predicted rates of domestic 
terrorist violence.  This counter-intuitive result may be due to differences in the nature of 
terrorist violence and political violence more generally.  A weak despotic government 
may face substantial claims against it by more direct forms of violence.  Remembering 
that terrorist violence is perpetrated against civilians by weaker organizations in order to 




more conventional methods of political violence may outpace terrorism.  Observing the 
levels of additional forms of political violence in these low-capacity nondemocracies 
may shed light on whether this postulate holds true.  The next chapter will deal somewhat 
with this inquiry.   
 
Severity and Regime Type/Repression Models 
 The final series of models substitutes the dependent variable of domestic terrorist 
events with the number of casualties from these events.
10
  The final constant sample 
resulting from the probit models consists of 617 observations of 59 countries over the 
same 22.6 year average.  Results from the two-step selection models are presented in 
Table 4.2.  Presented in incident rate ratios, these results depict to what degree the 
inclusive factors alter the predicted number of casualties per year. 
 The casualties baseline specification model aligns with the event-based model for 
the openness, regime type, percent urban, period effect, and conflict variables; however, 
only the openness and conflict variables retain any significance.  Each one-level increase 
in openness results in a 1% reduction in casualties, while one additional year of conflict 
results in an 11% increase and a one-level increase in average events results in an 
increase of less than 1%.  The population and GDP/capita variables retain significance, 
but in the opposite direction, as does the factor for communications.  Where increases in 
population and economic development resulted in 26% and 36% increases in the events   
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 Tests for multicollinearity produced VIFs (max/mean) that remain tolerable while 
warranting caution: Model 1 (6.75/3.05), Model 2 (7.00/3.18), Model 3 (7.73/3.87), 
Model 4 (6.83/3.00), Model 5 (7.06/3.18), Model 6 (6.84/3.14), Model 7 (8.78/4.09).  
High collinearity existed between variables for % living in urban areas and GDP/Capita 





Table 4.2. Repression and severity, 2-step selection model of negative binomial panel 
regressions (fixed effects) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Domestic 1.005*** 1.005*** 1.005*** 1.004*** 1.004*** 1.004*** 1.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        Logpop 0.805** 0.812* 0.824* 0.811* 0.875 0.799** 0.817* 
 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.069) (0.076) (0.091) (0.067) (0.069) 
        L.loggdppc 0.797** 0.887 0.928 0.750*** 0.729*** 0.755** 0.786** 
 
(0.063) (0.080) (0.088) (0.061) (0.061) (0.066) (0.073) 
        L.openc 0.995* 0.993** 0.994** 0.994** 0.997 0.995* 0.995* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
        L.polity2 1.003 1.000 1.014 1.007 0.992 1.003 1.017 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.018) 
        conflict5yr 1.100** 1.101** 1.099** 1.106** 1.104* 1.103** 1.107** 
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.039) (0.040) 
        avgtotal5yrs 1.002+ 1.001+ 1.001+ 1.003** 1.003** 1.002* 1.002+ 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        Logcom 1.116** 1.092* 1.081+ 1.129** 1.106* 1.110* 1.100* 
 
(0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.052) (0.047) (0.047) 
        Urban 0.993+ 0.989* 0.989* 0.995 0.998 0.994 0.994 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
        Decline 0.921 0.919 0.909 0.911 0.906 0.916 0.903 
 
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075) (0.074) 
        Imr 0.366*** 0.392** 0.421** 0.388** 0.410* 0.373*** 0.380*** 
 
(0.101) (0.130) (0.141) (0.124) (0.144) (0.102) (0.104) 
        L.invphysint 
 
1.047 1.022 
    
  
(0.034) (0.036) 
            L.physintXpolity2 
  
0.994 
    
   
(0.004) 
            L.imilperspc 
   
1.004 0.992 
  
    
(0.009) (0.011) 
          L.milXpol 
    
1.002* 
  
     
(0.001) 
          L.bureaucratic 
     
1.089 1.141* 
      
(0.063) (0.075) 
        L.burXpol 
      
0.989 
       
(0.008) 
        Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 664 659 659 640 640 664 664 
No. of countries 61 61 61 60 60 61 61 
        Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
  + p<0.10     * p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 





model, they result in decreases in casualties by rates of 20% and 23%, respectively. The 
communications factor, however, produces a positive effect.  A one-level increase results 
in a 12% increase in casualties from domestic terrorism as opposed to a 19% decrease in 
domestic events.   
 In the discussion on methods for calculating the level of terrorist violence, it was 
hoped that by evaluating models based on the severity of violence we might gain greater 
insight into the influence of regime space on this particular form of contentious politics.  
The results of the models provide some evidence that this is the case.  Most notably, the 
effects of regime space on the level of terrorist violence differ greatly from their effects 
on its severity.  Approached from the perspective of these two tenets of political 
opportunity structures, it appears that severity is much more difficult to predict than 
prevalence.  Clearly, population and economic development have a dampening effect on 
the severity of terrorist violence.  However, the history of conflict--as measured by the 
number of years in the previous 5 in which the state was involved in some form of state-
level conflict--matters much more than the level or the type of repressiveness the regime 
exhibits.  The same is true for the state's history with domestic terrorism.  In both cases, 
greater exposure leads to greater severity regardless of the number of events occurring in 
the given year.  Across the board, the inverse Mills ratios lend to the argument that the 
more likely a state is to experience an event of domestic terrorism, the less likely it is that 
it will result in large numbers of casualties.  The converse may also be true--the less 
likely the country is to experience an event, the more likely it is that when an event 




 One surprising finding involves the reverse in the direction of the effects of the 
communications variable.  Measuring the total number of telephone lines and mobile 
phone subscriptions, this variable was intended to account for state-level characteristics 
of development and infrastructure, as control over this means of communication has been 
theorized to contribute to the state's bureaucratic capacity.  However, the positive and 
significant effect in the severity models may speak to support of the resource 
mobilization component of political process theory.  As a mobilizing technology, 
communication lines--especially the ongoing improvements to mobile phones--may serve 
as a mobilizing platform for more severe incidents of domestic terrorism.  Alternatively, 
this technology may be viewed as a tool of the Weberian state to either repress or protect 
its citizens.  To this extent, the control and use of communications technology may be a 
resource available to both the state and those opposing it.  Further research on the 
influence of this particularly salient resource on terrorist violence--and social movements 
in general--could yield promising insights into its prominent role during the proliferation 
of recent movements known as the Arab Spring. 
 Of course, the present study is subject to several limitations that may influence 
both the magnitude and significance of the results for both dependent variables.  First, the 
present study took into account two of the four standard tenets of political opportunity 
structures--regime type and capacity and willingness to repress--in order to include some 
empirical measures of political opportunity structure in the models where they only 
inferred as much.  Including measures on the remaining tenets--the presence/absence of 
elite allies and the stability among elite alignments--might more clearly delineate the 




In addition, the factors involved measure the level of action against the state as well as 
certain state-level characteristics.  What is not included is any measure specifically 
accounting for the state's response.  Including such responses supports the idea of 
continuous interaction between states and social movements, and is of significant import.  
This is a point made by Oliver (1993) in her review of models of collective action. Some 
data exist for measuring state responses, for example, the World Handbook of Political 
Indicators IV provides data from 1990 to 2004 on government sanctions and relaxations.  
Though somewhat limited in scope and duration, incorporating these measures into the 
models may account for significant amounts of error.   
 Though modeling the effects of repressive capacity and regime type on terrorist 
violence does not precisely fit within Tilly's predictions of political violence within his 
typology, with respect to the prevalence of domestic terrorism, the general models do 
conform to the findings of Kis-Katos, Liebert, and Schulze--as well as the majority of 
research studying this specific form of contentious politics.  This supports the premise 
that domestic terrorist violence, though not identical to all other forms of political 
violence, can be studied utilizing tools designed to understand political opportunity 
structures.    
 
Summary 
 Much research has focused on the effects of democracy on social movements.  
Most findings support the argument that democracies, with liberalizing concepts such as 
civil liberties and political rights, give space for dissenting opinion to develop into 




Results from the analyses in this chapter support that general trend.  However, by 
utilizing Tilly's regime space typology to insert an additional dimension, these analyses 
provide further insight into that relationship.  Focusing on the interaction of regime type 
with repressiveness, this chapter demonstrates that while domestic terrorist events are 
predicted to increase with democracy regardless of level of repressiveness, different types 
of repressiveness produce different results.  Both latent and manifest repressive capacity--
as measured by military size and physical integrity rights violations respectively--add to 
that effect.  Bureaucratic quality attenuates the effect of regime type on domestic terrorist 
violence but does not reverse the trend.  This final form of repression mitigates the effects 
of polity but does not overcome them.  Perhaps this is simply due to the overtness of the 
former two and the covertness of the latter.  Media coverage of state-directed atrocities 
and the presence of military personnel as a symbol of state power may fuel the embers of 
dissent, while bureaucratic quality--though increasing the state's capacity to process 
information about potential discord--provides some beneficial improvement to the quality 
of life of its members, cooling those embers but not extinguishing them.  What is more 
difficult to predict is the intensity of the flames those embers produce.  Further 
improvements in data collection and research to identify the particular factors most 
influential in this process are needed. 
 For now, it is time to determine whether or not models predicting domestic 
terrorist violence, as theorized throughout this dissertation, share any salient connections 
with other forms of contentious politics and collective action.  Identifying these 
connections may ensure that terrorist violence and contentious politics do not continue 
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DOMESTIC TERRORISM AND NONVIOLENT PROTEST: 
ARROWS IN THE QUIVER OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 
Introduction 
 The substance of the argument set forth at the outset of this dissertation is that 
there must be a strengthening of ties between the study of terrorist violence and the 
theories espoused by researchers on social  movements.  Boyle's warning that proceeding 
down the present path would be detrimental to both the study of social movements and 
the study of terrorist violence formed the initial spark for the analyses of the previous two 
chapters.  By focusing on the specific tenet of political opportunity structures, it has been 
demonstrated that terrorist violence--much like corruption--can act as an alternative route 
to gaining power in the political process.  It has also been demonstrated that terrorist 
violence seems to operate similar to other forms of political violence when observing the 
effects of two of the foundational concepts of political opportunity structures on its 
prevalence--regime type and capacity and willingness to repress.  However, one final 
analysis must be made if the overarching argument--that terrorist violence should be 
considered  a social movement action--is to aid in preventing Boyle's predictions that 




  This final analysis will determine to what extent terrorist violence and non-
violent protest--the most prominent and distinguishing feature of 20th-century social 
movement action--are influenced by the unique characteristics of the targets of their 
demonstrations--mainly, the state.   The question comes down to whether or not social 
movement actions and other types of contentious politics are similarly influenced by the 
characteristics of regimes as the targets of those actions.   Here the focus will again be on 
political opportunity structures as the point of interaction between claimant and target, 
but will also incorporate the extra-legal opportunity structure identified through the 
analysis of corruption and terrorist violence.  Particularly, I will demonstrate whether 
terrorist violence and other forms of contentious politics such as nonviolent protest 
behave similarly under mainstream political opportunity structures and to what extent 
nonviolent protest, as an accepted and credible avenue of access to the political process, 
differs from terrorist violence when observed from the aspect of extralegal opportunity 
structures.   These findings can significantly bolster the case for including terrorist 
violence within the repertoire of social movements.  Before this analysis can be 
conducted, some additional groundwork surrounding social movements in general must 
be laid.   
 
The Social Movement Repertoire 
 Chapter 4 discussed the work of Charles Tilly (2010) with respect to regimes and 
repertoires of contention.  Within that work, Tilly distinguishes between social 
movements and a host of other manifestations of contentious politics (i.e., military coups, 




[involve] sustained challenges to power-holders in the name of one or more populations 
living under the jurisdiction of those power-holders by means of public displays 
dramatizing those populations' worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment (WUNC)" 
(Tilly 2010).  In outlining the properties of social movements as a form of contentious 
politics, Tilly argues that "the causal regularities of social movements are those of 
contentious politics in general" (Ibid, p. 183) but that social movements are set apart from 
contentious politics by "the combination of sustained campaigns, public performances, 
and demonstrations of [WUNCs]" (Ibid, p. 185).  The case for inclusion of terrorist 
violence within the repertoire of social movements--something Tilly avoids at great 
lengths-- is made based on the commonalities among the elements he assigns to it: 
campaigns of claim-making; an array of public performances (the repertoire); and 
repeated public displays designed to mobilize and perpetuate support (i.e., displaying 
signs, wearing colors, singing militant songs).  What remains to be shown is whether this 
case can be empirically demonstrated.  In order to accomplish this, the various forms of 
social movement action must first be identified and quantified.   
 Fortunately, this herculean feat has been undertaken as part of the massive 
ongoing effort to collect and collate sociologically significant state-level data initiated  by 
Arthur Banks known as the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive .  As part 
of this effort, Banks and his colleagues have identified eight unique forms of domestic 
conflict and amassed counts of their occurrence since the early 1960s.  These social 
movement actions are among the many forms of action by which groups may contend 
with each other in determining the manner by which society is to function.  Within this 




Banks' eight forms can quickly be separated into these two identifiers.  Assassinations, 
guerrilla warfare, purges (government initiated), riots, and revolutions comprise the form 
of violent conflict while general strikes and antigovernment demonstrations comprise the 
nonviolent form of conflict.  In order to accomplish the goals of this final analysis, 
actions from both types must be compared with the main object of inquiry throughout this 
dissertation--domestic terrorism.   
 
Actions and Their Precipitants 
 The simplest method for doing this is to utilize the models derived for predicting 
political violence used in the previous chapters and replace the dependent variable of 
domestic terrorist violence with incidents of the other forms of contentious politics 
highlighted by the CNTS data archive.  First, however, some mention must be made of 
how the predictive factors of terrorist violence stack up when attempting to predict the 
nonviolent actions on the other end of the scale.  Evidence in the literature supports the 
inclusion of many of the factors identified in the models for political violence as also 
being predictive of these additional forms of contentious politics--especially nonviolent 
antigovernment protest.  Prior research on the key factors of regime type and repressive 
capacity, as well as economic development, urbanization, and education is outlined 
below.  
 With respect to regime type, Scarritt, McMillan, and Mozaffar (2001) find that 
democracy and worker-student protests were mutually reinforcing in their study of 
ethnopolitical protest in Africa.  In his study of antinuclear protests in Europe, Kitschelt 




capacity democracies) exhibited the most effective programs of antinuclear nonviolent 
protest while the same strategy in weak and closed regimes resulted in little policy 
change.  This sentiment is echoed in a letter to John Saul by Rusty Bernstein, the 
outspoken proponent of the anti-apartheid campaign in South Africa.  In it, Bernstein 
discusses the ineffectiveness of nonviolent political protest in repressive regimes, stating 
that the turning point in the liberation of South Africa came with the decision to abandon 
its exclusive reliance on nonviolent campaigning (Bernstein and Saul 2007).  Though not 
the main means of liberation--and later abandoned by the anti-apartheid movement--the 
use of violent conflict emphasized the campaign's commitment and pressed the regime in 
ways that nonviolent protest could not (Zunes 1999).  These points emphasize the 
statement that political opportunity structures, as mapped by Tilly's regime space, explain 
the "enormous concentration of social movements in democratic regimes, especially 
high-capacity, democratic regimes" (Tilly 2010). 
 The effect of urbanization on both nonviolent and violent contentious politics has 
been shown to reduce the propensity for contentious politics (Buhaug and Urdal 2013).  
More urban populations have been theorized to be easier to control, being more proximal 
to the governmental means of authority (Herbst 2000).  Education has been demonstrated 
to increase the commitment of social movements to nonviolent action and increase the 
desire to contest repressive regimes (Hall, Rodeghier, and Useem 1986).  How education 
level affects nonviolent protest when observing its incidence rate in extra-legal 
opportunity structures may differ substantially.  Though their effects may vary greatly in 
direction and magnitude, what is noteworthy is that each of the aforementioned factors 




the violent or nonviolent nature of that action.  This lends to the overarching emphasis of 
this dissertation--that domestic terrorism should be considered a form of social movement 
action and studied similarly.   
 Based on the reviewed literature and the previous studies, it is anticipated that the 
results of the comparisons to follow will be somewhat intuitive.  First, the nonviolent 
forms of contentious politics should more readily approximate the models of violent 
protest when attempting to predict them from the more traditional views of political 
opportunity structures.  In the models observing regime type and repressive capacity, we 
would expect the impact of factors to be more similar between violent and nonviolent 
actions.  In the extra-legal models--which attempt to capture the effects of factors outside 
the more polite, peaceful, and civilized process of political dissent--we would expect 
greater disparity between the two types, culminating in very poor predictive capacity for 
the less violent forms.   
 
Data on Forms of Contentious Politics (Social Movement Action) 
 Nearly all of the data used in the analyses in this chapter have been described in 
the previous two chapters.  The only data not introduced to this point are those depicting 
the alternative dependent variables.  Though a brief overview was provided earlier in this 
chapter, a more detailed description of the CNTS data is called for here before 
proceeding to the analyses.  The CNTS data archive includes--among its vast array of 
state-level characteristics--the eight domestic conflict event variables mentioned above.  
These variables are adopted from Rudolph J. Rummel's (1963) "Dimensions of Conflict 




Assassinations--Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a 
high government official or politician 
 
General Strikes--Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers 
that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at the national 
government policies or authority 
 
Guerrilla Warfare--Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on 
by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the 
overthrow of the present regime 
 
Major Government Crises--Any rapidly developing situation that threatens 
to bring the downfall of the present regime--excluding situations of revolt 
aimed at such overthrow 
 
Purges--Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political 
opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition 
 
Riots--Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens 
involving the use of physical force 
 
Revolutions--Any illegal or forced change in the top government elite, any 
attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion 
whose aim is independence from the central government 
 
Antigovernment Demonstrations--Any peaceful public gathering of at least 
100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition 
to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a 
distinctly antiforeign nature 
 
 The present analyses rely only on data for the Assassinations, Riots, General 
Strikes, and Antigovernment Demonstrations variables.  This restriction is due to the fact 
that the Revolutions and Guerrilla warfare variables are too closely related to the 
definition of terrorist violence espoused throughout these chapters, that the Government 
Crises variable is too vague in its definition, and that the Purges variable contains data on 
both the opposition and the state.  As it stands, the analyses will include the reference 
category of domestic terrorist violence along with two measures each of violent and non-




York Times, and represent the number of events of each particular sort in a given year for 
a given country.  Data are available from 1815 through 2012, and cover over 200 
countries.  A note should be made as to the validity of data derived from the CNTS data 
archive.  While the data have been utilized extensively by sociological researchers, some 
have noted that overreliance on the single source and arbitrary coding methods may 
contribute to significant bias (Bell et al. 2013, Nam 2006).  However, as the availability 
of more detailed are not available, the risk of potential bias will have to be assumed.   
 As indicated, models from the previous two chapters will be utilized as a platform 
for determining the feasibility of measuring the five different forms of contentious 
political action in the same way.  Each of the four additional forms will be analyzed first 
with the extra-legal opportunity structure model of Chapter 3 before being analyzed with 




 Table 5.1 represents the results of the extra-legal opportunity structure models 
across the various forms of contentious politics contained in the CNTS data archive. 
Tables 5.2-5.4 represent the results of models measuring the regime type and repressive 
capacity tenets of the more mainstream political opportunity structure.  All models are 
negative binomial fixed effects regressions and were run utilizing constant samples, 





Table 5.1  Negative binomial regressions for extra-legal POS models with various forms 
of contentious politics 
 
 





 strikes riots 
anti-gov  
protests 
      Corruption 0.844+ 0.735+ 0.782 1.200 1.135 
 
(0.076) (0.117) (0.119) (0.160) (0.116) 
      L2.corruption 0.784** 0.938 0.581*** 0.862 0.960 
 
(0.065) (0.145) (0.091) (0.108) (0.091) 
      coerc 0.774*** 0.802** 0.945 0.818** 0.921 
 
(0.034) (0.065) (0.065) (0.057) (0.049) 
      L.coerc 0.901* 0.819* 1.010 1.026 0.975 
 
(0.039) (0.064) (0.065) (0.072) (0.051) 
      repress 1.923** 0.701 1.289 1.825 1.784* 
 
(0.477) (0.268) (0.509) (0.709) (0.479) 
      repress2 0.935* 1.072 0.960 0.946 0.951 
 
(0.029) (0.050) (0.054) (0.046) (0.033) 
      loggdppc 0.120*** 0.175+ 0.093** 3.085* 1.313 
 
(0.050) (0.160) (0.083) (1.735) (0.607) 
      ieineq 0.966* 1.049 1.019 1.027 1.024 
 
(0.016) (0.034) (0.029) (0.024) (0.019) 
      logpop 0.008*** 0.007** 0.133 0.604 0.537 
 
(0.006) (0.010) (0.204) (0.713) (0.478) 
      primary 1.038*** 0.988 0.976 0.978 1.012 
 
(0.011) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012) 
      tertiary 0.949 0.981 0.716*** 0.936 0.998 
 
(0.049) (0.104) (0.064) (0.084) (0.061) 
      L.eventnat 1.005*** 1.002+ 0.999 1.001 1.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      gtd1984 0.657* 0.504* 0.914 1.807* 1.083 
 
(0.111) (0.142) (0.213) (0.457) (0.211) 
      gtd2005 2.505*** 0.620 0.574 0.704 0.720 
 
(0.507) (0.230) (0.237) (0.212) (0.160) 
      No. of Observations 1254 1252 1252 1251 1252 
No. of Countries 
     Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BIC 6559.417 1846.771 1523.623 2217.525 3161.811 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
  + p<0.10     * p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 









Table 5.2  Negative binomial regressions for POS models (polity and physical integrity rights violations) 
 
 















logpop 1.206** 1.213** 1.512* 1.586** 1.110 1.152 2.736* 2.730* 1.066 1.098 
 
(0.083) (0.083) (0.245) (0.261) (0.144) (0.152) (1.126) (1.082) (0.108) (0.114) 
           L.loggdppc 1.601*** 1.545*** 1.404+ 1.315 0.651*** 0.632*** 0.910 0.904 0.823+ 0.804* 
 
(0.124) (0.120) (0.255) (0.245) (0.084) (0.083) (0.173) (0.171) (0.082) (0.081) 
           L.openc 0.993** 0.992** 1.003 1.003 0.990* 0.991* 1.004 1.004 0.998 0.999 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
           L.polity2 1.061*** 1.018 1.035* 0.992 1.009 0.980 1.033* 1.019 0.988 0.969* 
 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.017) (0.023) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026) (0.010) (0.015) 
           conflict5yr 1.147*** 1.144*** 0.991 0.991 1.016 1.015 1.063 1.062 1.099** 1.097** 
 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.047) (0.047) (0.036) (0.036) (0.044) (0.043) (0.032) (0.032) 
           avgtotal5yrs 1.002** 1.002*** 1.003* 1.004** 0.996** 0.996* 0.998+ 0.998+ 0.998* 0.998* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
           logcom 0.795*** 0.791*** 0.669*** 0.665*** 0.882* 0.870* 0.557*** 0.557*** 0.858** 0.849*** 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.057) (0.056) (0.051) (0.050) (0.054) (0.053) (0.041) (0.041) 
           urban 0.991* 0.991* 0.997 0.998 1.034*** 1.034*** 1.028+ 1.027+ 1.036*** 1.036*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) 
           decline 0.552*** 0.539*** 1.880*** 1.786*** 0.603*** 0.585*** 0.906 0.899 1.102 1.079 
 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.252) (0.240) (0.069) (0.067) (0.110) (0.110) (0.091) (0.090) 
           L.invphysint 1.213*** 1.310*** 1.194*** 1.265*** 1.091* 1.121** 1.108** 1.128** 1.120*** 1.145*** 
 
(0.030) (0.042) (0.053) (0.065) (0.037) (0.041) (0.043) (0.053) (0.030) (0.035) 





















No. of Observations 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 
No. of Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BIC 5854.230 5845.802 1647.041 1648.137 2266.833 2270.305 1573.526 1580.289 3417.458 3422.062 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
     + p<0.10     * p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 








Table 5.3  Negative binomial regressions for POS models (polity and size of military) 
 















Logpop 1.435*** 1.442*** 1.337 1.359 1.124 1.134 2.507** 2.522* 1.054 1.069 
 
(0.102) (0.104) (0.246) (0.254) (0.161) (0.164) (0.890) (0.916) (0.117) (0.118) 
           L.loggdppc 1.260** 1.267** 1.217 1.058 0.724* 0.684** 1.112 1.142 0.865 0.815+ 
 
(0.103) (0.106) (0.249) (0.226) (0.102) (0.098) (0.260) (0.281) (0.094) (0.091) 
           L.openc 0.999 0.999 1.001 1.001 0.996 0.995 1.001 1.001 0.997 0.997 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
           L.polity2 1.043*** 1.047** 1.024 0.982 1.004 0.980 1.021 1.027 0.996 0.971+ 
 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.026) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.012) (0.017) 
           conflict5yr 1.197*** 1.197*** 1.076 1.079 1.022 1.015 1.090* 1.092* 1.112*** 1.112*** 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.050) (0.051) (0.040) (0.040) (0.047) (0.047) (0.035) (0.035) 
           avgtotal5yrs 1.004*** 1.004*** 1.005*** 1.005*** 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
           Logcom 0.827*** 0.824*** 0.687*** 0.694*** 0.885* 0.906 0.588*** 0.585*** 0.875** 0.889* 
 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.059) (0.061) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.043) (0.044) 
           Urban 0.992+ 0.992+ 0.999 1.005 1.024* 1.025** 1.002 1.001 1.025** 1.027*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) 
           Decline 0.512*** 0.510*** 1.860*** 1.908*** 0.608*** 0.627*** 0.984 0.976 1.114 1.140 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.252) (0.257) (0.074) (0.077) (0.125) (0.125) (0.098) (0.101) 
           L.imilperspc 1.045*** 1.051** 0.983 0.949+ 0.992 0.956 0.987 0.998 1.000 0.967 
 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.022) (0.028) (0.018) (0.028) (0.026) (0.038) (0.015) (0.022) 





















No. of Observations 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 
No. of Countries 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BIC 4959.133 4966.083 1513.995 1516.253 1855.825 1860.126 1351.045 1357.988 2906.122 2908.846 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
     + p<0.10     * p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 








Table 5.3  Negative binomial regressions for POS models (polity and bureaucratic quality) 
 
 

















Logpop 1.215* 1.237* 1.515* 1.486* 1.075 1.104 2.895** 3.181** 1.068 1.067 
 
(0.104) (0.106) (0.283) (0.277) (0.169) (0.175) (0.940) (1.120) (0.132) (0.132) 
           L.loggdppc 1.369*** 1.418*** 1.276 1.353 0.500*** 0.541** 1.070 1.206 0.871 0.879 
 
(0.129) (0.136) (0.268) (0.292) (0.092) (0.105) (0.270) (0.339) (0.128) (0.133) 
           L.openc 0.995+ 0.995+ 1.003 1.003 0.991+ 0.991+ 1.002 1.003 0.997 0.997 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
           L.polity2 1.045*** 1.076*** 1.039* 1.065* 0.980 1.008 1.018 1.049* 0.970* 0.973 
 
(0.012) (0.021) (0.020) (0.030) (0.017) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.013) (0.018) 
           conflict5yr 1.310*** 1.316*** 1.091+ 1.092+ 0.985 0.994 1.059 1.075 1.081* 1.082* 
 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.054) (0.054) (0.042) (0.043) (0.052) (0.053) (0.037) (0.037) 
           avgtotal5yrs 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.003* 1.004* 0.998 0.997 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
           logcom 0.819*** 0.817*** 0.596*** 0.603*** 0.929 0.925 0.539*** 0.546*** 0.919 0.920 
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059) (0.050) (0.051) 
           urban 0.990+ 0.990+ 1.005 1.001 1.040*** 1.039** 1.016 1.009 1.026* 1.026* 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) 
           decline 0.489*** 0.490*** 1.845*** 1.857*** 0.580*** 0.583*** 0.993 1.001 1.181+ 1.183+ 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.260) (0.262) (0.074) (0.074) (0.134) (0.134) (0.110) (0.110) 
           L.bureaucratic 1.133* 1.250** 1.018 1.127 1.364*** 1.419*** 1.090 1.279+ 1.034 1.043 
 
(0.071) (0.101) (0.115) (0.157) (0.128) (0.140) (0.136) (0.181) (0.074) (0.081) 





















No. of Observations 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 1089 
No. of Countries 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BIC 4505.095 4508.373 1433.081 1438.533 1652.260 1657.097 1248.413 1250.548 2567.742 2574.655 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses 
     + p<0.10     * p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 




Extra-legal Opportunity Structure Models 
 In the models predicting levels of action based on factors pertinent to illicit 
opportunity structures (Table 5.1), the models have very poor predictive capacity outside 
of terrorist violence.  The next-most-closely associated form of social movement action is 
that of assassinations.  Here, the models share significance and direction for change in 
corruption level (increased corruption = decreased action), physical integrity rights 
(greater respect = fewer actions), economic development (improvement = fewer actions), 
population (higher pop = fewer actions), and history of violent action (more incidents in 
previous year = more actions in the current year).   
 The similarities in results for these two violent forms of actions may be due to the 
fact that both lie on the extreme end of actions and they both rely on fewer participants to 
carry out the action than the remaining forms of riots, strikes, and protests.  In those 
instances, the models' predictive power is very poor.  Perceived corruption only reaches 
significance when observing general strikes against the government, and then only when 
observing its lagged effect.  This finding is intriguing, as it would be expected that higher 
levels of corruption would increase the propensity for action.  What may be at play here 
is the effectiveness of the illicit opportunity structure in co-opting protest.  Future 
research on the interplay of corruption and the means of dissent is needed to corroborate 
this speculation.   
 Another significant observation is that under the illicit opportunity structure 
model, economic development demonstrates a significantly large effect on the prevalence 
of riots.  The basic interpretation of this effect is that richer countries experience greater 




host of underlying factors, is soaking up a large proportion of the variance in the model.  
Adjusting the model to incorporate more specific factors predictive of riotous violence 
may attenuate this rather large effect.   
 Finally, with respect to antigovernment protests, the only factor reaching 
significance is the measure for repression (a combination of civil liberties and political 
rights scores from Freedom House's Freedom in the World ratings).  This finding is 
significant when expanding to the general thesis that social movement actions consist of a 
variety of violent and nonviolent means--including terrorist violence.  These results 
demonstrate that repression influences the prevalence of more moderate forms of action 
even in the presence of factors indicative of more illicit opportunity structures. 
 
Political Opportunity Structure Models 
 Overall, the models investigating non-violent protest that produce the most 
significance are those pertaining to the inclusion of actual repression as opposed to those 
including measures of repressive capacity.  This may attest to the idea that actual 
repression is a more tangible and salient touchstone for protest in any form than the 
potential that states may possess to repress.  When including the measure of violations 
against physical integrity rights, polity and its interactive effect with physical integrity 
rights, conflict, communications, economic development, urbanization, and repression all 
produce significant results for a majority of the actions tested.  This is especially the case 
for the interaction of polity and physical integrity rights violations (see Fig. 5.2).  Here, 
while increases in violations predict significant increases in events of every sort, the 




protest.  Reaching back to Tilly's regime space, the results provide evidence for the 
prediction that--when exercising their high-capacity--democratic regimes, may 
experience greater levels of violent antigovernment action.   
 Of particular note, the two measures for conflict (state-level conflict over the past 
5 years and the average number of total of terrorist events over the same period) behave 
differently when observing violent and nonviolent action.  While increases in state-level 
conflict result in increases in actions of every sort, only the more violent forms of 
domestic terrorism and assassinations are predicted to increase in the presence of higher 
averages of terrorist violence.  All other forms (including riots) are predicted to decrease 
with more terrorism.  This may speak to the rational-choice perspective of social 
movement action.  When terrorism is an active component, other forms of contentious 
politics may not be as effective.   
 There is one final note to be made with respect to the effectiveness of the models.  
As indicated by the BIC statistics for each set of models, while the domestic terrorism 
models produce the most significance, they do not provide the best fit among the forms of 
contentious politics.  This may be due to both the rarity of terrorist events and the 
clustering of these events within certain regions and countries.  Observing regional 
effects for the models may help improve this limitation. 
 
Summary 
 The intent laid out at the beginning of this chapter was to determine to what 
extent the various forms of contentious politics can be said to operate in similar fashion 




Although there are some similarities between the different types of actions available to 
social movements, significant differences remain.  Support exists for the inclusion of all 
of these forms of action within the social movement repertoire, but further research must 
be accomplished in order to improve the models predictive capacity with respect to each 
individual form.  The effect of communication on all forms of contentious politics 
remains a significant finding and the primary point of departure for continuing research.  
As viewed through the tenets of political opportunity structures, its varied effects on the 
prevalence of these distinct forms of action may provide substantial understanding on the 
diverse outcomes of movements in the recent phenomenon of the Arab Spring.  
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 The overarching theme to this dissertation has been the idea that domestic terrorist 
violence can and ought to be considered as one of the many forms of social movement 
action.  Viewed as social movement action, domestic terrorist violence becomes a 
response to the state by those wishing to alter the current form of social order.  
Reviewing the sociological theories available for defending this position, the most cogent 
and easily presented theoretical basis for this idea lies in the concept of political 
opportunity structures.  With the capacity for accommodating numerous factors 
influencing the particular structure created in each instance, observing political 
opportunity structures seems an ideal fit for attempting to understand the varied 
experiences states have with domestic terrorist violence.  In each instance, a social 
movement's interaction with a particular political opportunity structure presents a profile 
of action and potential use of those actions (Tilly's "repertoires of contention").  Adhering 
to this line of reasoning, the various analyses demonstrated the unique characteristics 
domestic terrorist violence exhibits when viewed as social movement action.  Couched in 
the concepts of political opportunity structures, the empirical analyses of this dissertation 





1)  How does domestic terrorist violence fit conceptually within the concept of 
political opportunity structures? 
 2)  How does variation in the characteristics of the political opportunity structure 
alter the manifestation of terrorist violence? 
 3)  Do other forms of social movement action (both violent and nonviolent) 
behave in a similar manner as domestic terrorist violence? 
 Chapter 3 focused specifically on the concept of state-level corruption as it 
pertains to the emergence of domestic terrorist violence.  This effort sought to determine 
if corruption operated as a catalyst for domestic terrorist violence by those unable to 
access the legitimate political opportunity structure or if it mitigated domestic terrorist 
violence by allowing those utilizing corruption to 'peaceably' maintain the level of 
influence they desired.  The outcome of the study demonstrated that the latter is much 
more consistent with the data.  Corruption and domestic terrorist violence share space as 
components of an extralegal opportunity structure.  When the avenue of corruption was 
diminished by anticorruption campaigns, domestic terrorism increased significantly.  In 
instances where the particular path of corruption could not be employed to gain political 
influence, organizations seeking that influence utilized alternative strategies--terrorism 
being a significant item on the list--to fill the gap. 
 Chapter 4 observed the effects of two of the conventional tenets of political 
opportunity structures on the prevalence and severity of domestic terrorist violence.  
Results from this study demonstrated that regime type and repressive capacity 
significantly influenced the prevalence of terrorism, but not its severity.  The findings in 




political violence specifically--are corroborated by the results of this study.  While the 
effect of democracy held true, including the repressive capacity of the state produced 
results that differed significantly from those expected by Tilly in his description of 
regime space.  These results refined Tilly's concept of regime space with respect to 
political violence.  While Tilly expected to observe low levels of violence in high-
capacity democratic regimes, when observing terrorist violence, greater levels of 
democracy and capacity exhibit the greatest levels of terrorist violence.  These findings 
attest to the inclusion of domestic terrorism as a form of political violence--and therefore 
social movement action--while at the same time demonstrating its distinct nature in the 
face of more complex models of political opportunity structures.  
 At the outset of this dissertation, terrorist violence was theorized to exist within 
the realm of social movement action.  Chapter 5 sought to compare several disparate 
types of social movement action utilizing the models from the previous analyses in an 
effort to demonstrate their interrelatedness.  Analyzing the results of the models applied 
to various forms of both violent and nonviolent action demonstrated that none of these 
forms conformed to the extralegal opportunity structure model to the degree of domestic 
terrorism.  This attests to the notion that terrorist violence--as an action--may be 
employed by diverse groups for similarly wide-ranging purposes, and that at least two of 
those purposes include accessing the political opportunity structures of the state.  The 
remaining models produced results upholding this notion.  While the results of the 
models somewhat approximated those of the domestic terrorism models, the differences 
demonstrate the need to distinguish and accurately model these disparate types of social 




movement action might be roughly conceptualized by the Venn diagram presented in 
Figure 6.1.  Here, while the less violent forms of general strikes and protests may overlap 
substantially in description and contributive factors, they share some of that space with 
the more violent forms of action.  The diagram in Figure 6.1 is notional, and only 
marginally influenced by the results of the analyses contained in this dissertation, but it 
provides a initial canvas upon which to work.  Further research in understanding this 
space of social movement action will clarify these relationships.  Still, this is not the only 




 I imagine the goal of any researcher is to answer the question initially stated at the 
commencement of the research process.  It has become much clearer to me, as this 
process has unfolded, that one of the greatest benefits in attempting to achieve that goal is 










Social Movement Action Space
 




research, while not always providing answers to the initial question, stimulates additional 
inquiry.  Throughout the process of producing this dissertation, a plethora of tangential 
questions have arisen.  It is as if the end result were to be compared to the construction of 
a well.  Though hastily dug and meagerly protected, some water has been found at the 
bottom.  This well's rough-hewn structure now provides a source from which to draw a 
lifetime of research.  As testament to the richness of the resource tapped by this well, 
several of the questions that have arisen are outlined below. 
 In defining the repertoires available to social movements, Tilly (2010) makes a 
particular point that "activists in today's European cities...stay away from suicide-
bombing, hostage-taking, and self-immolation" (p. 35) because it is outside the 
"repertoire already established for their place, time and [claimant-object] pair" (p. 35).  
However, in other parts of the world, it appears that this established repertoire allows for 
such actions.  Of significant interest and potential implications, regional differences may 
provide substantial insight into the emergence and perpetuation of domestic terrorism as 
social movement action.  This factor was not included in the models replicated in the 
analyses conducted for this dissertation; however, observing the event data demonstrates 
that a significant number of these events occur during specific times in specific locations.  
During the 1980s, events clustered in the countries of Central and South America.  The 
most recent era centers terrorist activity in the Maghreb, Middle East, and South Asia.  
Observing under what conditions were present as domestic terrorism arose in each of 
these periods and contrasting these with particular regions with similar conditions where 
terrorism did not proliferate would provide greater understanding of how and where it 




 The previous research question might be subsumed under a broader investigation 
of social movement action in general.  The final analyses of Chapter 5 were far from all-
inclusive in describing the relationships between the various forms of social movement 
action.  Seeking out improved data sources on each of these actions, identifying the 
trends of their emergence, and uncovering the potential interrelatedness and dependence 
of these disparate types of action on each other will aid in better telling the story of social 
movement action.  It may also provide insight and some predictive capacity on when and 
in what manner the more violent forms might manifest themselves. 
 While political opportunity structures provided the 'structure' upon which the 
analyses were constructed, the concept of extra-legal opportunity structures has also been 
raised.  These structures are inherently more difficult to define and quantify.  However, 
two of the components--corruption and domestic terrorism--have been linked through the 
results in Chapter 3.  What other mechanisms operate within these structures and how do 
they relate to each other?  Identifying these additional tenets of extra-legal opportunity 
structures would shine light on a corner of the political process model that could explain 
significant amounts of the variance seen in models relying solely on the formal process. 
 The second set of models from Chapter 4 produced poor results as to predictive 
capacity of the severity of domestic terrorist violence.  Though difficult to predict to this 
point, improving upon the initial model---or developing a more appropriate one with 
respect to the severity of violence--is an effort that needs to be made.  Through better 
understanding the factors leading to the most severe cases of terrorist violence, 
researchers may be able to stem the tide of loss of life and severe injury, relegating 




among the groups that utilize terrorist violence, some are more violent than others, 
inflicting greater casualty rates.  What relationship exists between those who practice 
indiscriminant violence to an indiscriminant degree of severity, and those who do so 
selectively?  Is there a form of terror-less terrorism that relies on the fear of severe 
casualties without ever inflicting them themselves? 
 A surprising finding emerged when conducting a meta-analysis of the results of 
the severity models in Chapter 4 and final analyses of Chapter 5.  In both sets of models, 
communication was included as an independent variable.  Operationalized as the total 
number of telephone lines and mobile phone subscriptions, this variable resulted in 
significant effects across nearly all models.  In observing its effect on the rate of domestic 
terrorist violence, as well as the rates of all other tested forms of social movement action, 
communication exhibited significant negative effects.  Though still significant, when 
observing communication's effect on the severity of domestic terrorist events, the effects 
were positive.  The conflicting results, first noted in Chapter 4, are enhanced by the 
finding that this cuts across all forms of social movement action.  Understanding how 
communication may be co-opted by either side in their quest to mobilize resources would 
further cement the findings of these analyses within the literature on social movements.   
 Finally, while the analyses in this dissertation focused on the political opportunity 
structure tenets of regime type and repressiveness, the effects of McAdam's (1996) 
remaining two tenets--stability of elite alignments and presence of elite allies--remain to 
be seen.  Theorizing, operationalizing, and modeling the relationships of these two final 
tenets and incorporating them into a full model of political opportunity structure would 




 The six topics briefly described above are a short list of the many potential 
departure points generated by the research contained in this dissertation.  Further 
development and refinement of the analyses contained within it, as well as these topics, 
will provide sufficient water to quench the thirst of this researcher for years to come. 
 
Summary 
 The events of September 11, 2001 resulted in a windfall for researchers studying 
political violence in the United States.  Funding poured from government coffers as 
policy makers attempted to justify their efforts to better understand the threat they faced 
from terrorist violence on a scale not seen before.  The deluge of studies that followed 
provided such a detailed level of analysis on the concept of terrorist violence--from its 
very definition to who engages in it and what effects it has on every aspect of social life--
that it threatened to allow researchers to view terrorism as sui generis, decoupling it from 
the broader concepts of political violence and social movements.  As research on this 
highly controversial and still politically relevant topic continues, what is of utmost 
concern is that researchers discover and investigate the similarities of terrorist violence 
with other forms of political violence--and social movement action more broadly--as 
often and as thoroughly as they discover and investigate what sets terrorist violence apart.   
 This is the goal set by Boyle in his treatise on the progress of political violence 
research.  The analyses provided in this dissertation constitute an effort to do just that.  
Re-anchoring terrorist violence within the theories of social movements--especially the 
concept of political opportunity structures--facilitates comparisons to other forms of 




extrapolating from the differences in order to shed light on potential avenues for future 
inquiries will ensure that the benefits from the vast amounts of research on political 
violence and social movements that have been generated in the past 20 years will not be 
restricted solely to the particular form of violence under investigation.   
 The insights gained from the analyses in this dissertation should be applied to the 
approach taken by states as well as the international community in any attempt to 
accomplish goals that might result in the emergence of domestic terrorist violence as a 
particular form of social movement action.  From anticorruption programs to aiding 
fledgling democracies or monitoring the overthrow of repressive regimes, the particular 
profile of the political opportunity structures available directly affect the type of actions 
those demanding or protesting change may take.  Under the right conditions--some of 
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